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Naïve optimality: Subjects' heuristics can be better motivated than experimenters' optimal models

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Jonathan D. Nelson
Jonathan D. Nelson
Affiliation:
Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin 14195, Germany. jnelson@salk.eduhttp://jonathandnelson.com/
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Abstract

Is human cognition best described by optimal models, or by adaptive but suboptimal heuristic strategies? It is frequently hard to identify which theoretical model is normatively best justified. In the context of information search, naïve subjects' heuristic strategies are better motivated than some “optimal” models.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 1 , February 2009 , pp. 94 - 95
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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