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Neurath's ship: The constitutive relation between normative and descriptive theories of rationality
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 October 2011
Abstract
I defend the claim that in psychological theories concerned with theoretical or practical rationality there is a constitutive relation between normative and descriptive theories: Normative theories provide idealized descriptive accounts of rational agents. However, we need to resist the temptation to collapse descriptive theories with any specific normative theory. I show how a partial separation is possible.
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Neurath's ship: The constitutive relation between normative and descriptive theories of rationality
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