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Non-instrumental belief is largely founded on singularity1
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 January 2010
Abstract
The radical evolutionary step that divides human decision-making from that of nonhumans is the ability to excite the reward process for its own sake, in imagination. Combined with hyperbolic over-valuation of the present, this ability is a potential threat to both the individual's long term survival and the natural selection of high intelligence. Human belief is intrinsically “unfounded” or under-founded, which may or may not be adaptive.
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010
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