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The notion of incommensurability can be extended to the child's developing theories of mind as well

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 May 2011

Szabolcs Kiss
Szabolcs Kiss
Affiliation:
Institute of Sociology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1014 Budapest, Uri. u. 49., Hungary. kiss.szabolcs@t-online.hu
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Abstract

In this commentary I argue that the notion of incommensurability can be extended to the child's developing theories of mind. I use Carey's concept of Quinian bootstrapping and show that this learning process can account for the acquisition of the semantics of mental terms. I suggest a distinction among three stages of acquisition and adopt the theory–theory of conceptual development.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 3 , June 2011 , pp. 134 - 135
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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References

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