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Numerical magnitude evaluation as a foundation for decision making

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 July 2017

Christopher Y. Olivola  and
Nick Chater
Christopher Y. Olivola
Affiliation:
Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213olivola@cmu.eduhttps://sites.google.com/site/chrisolivola/
Nick Chater
Affiliation:
Behavioural Science Group, Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, United KingdomNick.Chater@wbs.ac.ukhttp://www.wbs.ac.uk/about/person/nick-chater/
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Abstract

The evaluation of magnitudes serves as a foundation not only for numerical and mathematical cognition, but also for decision making. Recent theoretical developments and empirical studies have linked numerical magnitude evaluation to a wide variety of core phenomena in decision making and challenge the idea that preferences are driven by an innate, universal, and stable sense of number or value.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 40 , 2017 , e183
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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