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On the relation between phenomenal and representational properties

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 1997

Güven Güzeldere  and
Murat Aydede
Güven Güzeldere
Affiliation:
Duke University, Department of Philosophy, Durham, NC 27708 guven@aas.duke.edu www.duke.edu/philosophy/faculty/guzeldere.html
Murat Aydede
Affiliation:
The University of Chicago, Department of Philosophy, Chicago, IL 60637 maydede@midway.uchicago.edu tuna.uchicago.edu/homes/murat/index.ma.html
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Abstract

We argue that Block's charge of fallacy remains ungrounded so long as the existence of P-consciousness, as Block construes it, is independently established. This, in turn, depends on establishing the existence of “phenomenal properties” that are essentially not representational, cognitive, or functional. We argue that Block leaves this fundamental thesis unsubstantiated. We conclude by suggesting that phenomenal consciousness can be accounted for in terms of a hybrid set of representational and functional properties.

Type
Continuing Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , March 1997 , pp. 151 - 153
Copyright
© 1997 Cambridge University Press

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