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A one-system theory that is not propositional

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2009

James E. Witnauer ,
Gonzalo P. Urcelay  and
Ralph R. Miller
James E. Witnauer
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, State University of New York–Binghamton, Binghamton, NY 13902-6000jwitnau1@binghamton.edurmiller@binghamton.eduhttp://www2.binghamton.edu/psychology/
Gonzalo P. Urcelay
Affiliation:
Department of Experimental Psychology and Behavioural and Clinical Neuroscience Institute, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 3EB, United Kingdom. gu203@cam.ac.ukhttp://www.psychol.cam.ac.uk/
Ralph R. Miller
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, State University of New York–Binghamton, Binghamton, NY 13902-6000jwitnau1@binghamton.edurmiller@binghamton.eduhttp://www2.binghamton.edu/psychology/
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Abstract

We argue that the propositional and link-based approaches to human contingency learning represent different levels of analysis because propositional reasoning requires a basis, which is plausibly provided by a link-based architecture. Moreover, in their attempt to compare two general classes of models (link-based and propositional), Mitchell et al. refer to only two generic models and ignore the large variety of different models within each class.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 2 , April 2009 , pp. 228 - 229
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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