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Overselling the case against normativism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 October 2011

Tim Fuller  and
Richard Samuels
Tim Fuller
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210. fuller.193@osu.eduhttp://people.cohums.ohio-state.edu/fuller193/samuels.58@osu.eduhttp://people.cohums.ohio-state.edu/samuels58/
Richard Samuels
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210. fuller.193@osu.eduhttp://people.cohums.ohio-state.edu/fuller193/samuels.58@osu.eduhttp://people.cohums.ohio-state.edu/samuels58/
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Abstract

Though we are in broad agreement with much of Elqayam & Evans' (E&E's) position, we criticize two aspects of their argument. First, rejecting normativism is unlikely to yield the benefits that E&E seek. Second, their conception of rational norms is overly restrictive and, as a consequence, their arguments at most challenge a relatively restrictive version of normativism.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 5 , October 2011 , pp. 255
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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References

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