Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-dh8gc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-14T19:14:59.279Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

P-Consciousness presentation/A-Consciousness representation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 1997

Denise Gamble
Denise Gamble
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, The University of Adelaide, Adelaide 5005, South Australiadgamble@arts.adelaide.edu.au
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

P-Consciousness (P) is to be understood in terms of an immediate fluctuating continuum that is a presentation of raw experiential matter against which A-consciousness (A) acts to objectify, impose form or make determinate “thinkable” contents. A representationalises P but P is not itself representational, at least in terms of some concepts of “representation.” Block's arguments fall short of establishing that P is representational and, given the sort of cognitive science assumptions he is working with, he is unable to account for the aspect of phenomenal content that he thinks goes beyond “representational” content. BBS discussion reveals the need for greater analysis and justification for a representationalist thesis of P.

Type
Continuing Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , March 1997 , pp. 149 - 150
Copyright
© 1997 Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)