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Person as lawyer: How having a guilty mind explains attributions of intentional agency

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 October 2010

Frank Hindriks
Frank Hindriks
Affiliation:
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen, 9712 GL Groningen, The Netherlands. f.a.hindriks@rug.nlhttp://www.rug.nl/staff/f.a.hindriks/index
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Abstract

In criminal law, foresight betrays a guilty mind as much as intent does: both reveal that the agent is not properly motivated to avoid an illegal state of affairs. This commonality warrants our judgment that the state is brought about intentionally, even when unintended. In contrast to Knobe, I thus retain the idea that acting intentionally is acting with a certain frame of mind.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 33 , Issue 4 , August 2010 , pp. 339 - 340
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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