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Person as moralist and scientist

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 October 2010

Marcus Vinícius C. Baldo
Affiliation:
“Roberto Vieira” Laboratory of Sensory Physiology, Department of Physiology and Biophysics, Institute of Biomedical Sciences, University of São Paulo, SP 05508-900, São Paulo, Brazil. baldo@usp.brhttp://www.fisio.icb.usp.br/~vinicius
Anouk Barberousse
Affiliation:
Institut d'Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques (IHPST), UMR 8590, CNRS, Université Paris 1, ENS, 75006 Paris, France. barberou@heraclite.ens.frhttp://www-ihpst.univ-paris1.fr/en/4,anouk_barberousse.html

Abstract

Scientific inquiry possibly shares with people's ordinary understanding the same evolutionary determinants, and affect-laden intuitions that shape moral judgments also play a decisive role in decision-making, planning, and scientific reasoning. Therefore, if ordinary understanding does differ from scientific inquiry, the reason does not reside in the fact that the former (but not the latter) is endowed with moral considerations.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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