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Post hoc rationalism in science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 August 2011

Eric Luis Uhlmann
Eric Luis Uhlmann
Affiliation:
HEC Paris–School of Management, Management and Human Resources Department, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas, France. eric.luis.uhlmann@gmail.comwww.socialjudgments.com
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Abstract

In advocating Bayesian Enlightenment as a solution to Bayesian Fundamentalism, Jones & Love (J&L) rule out a broader critique of rationalist approaches to cognition. However, Bayesian Fundamentalism is merely one example of the more general phenomenon of Rationalist Fundamentalism: the tendency to characterize human judgments as rational and optimal in a post hoc manner, after the empirical data are already known.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 4 , August 2011 , pp. 214
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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