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Problematic aspects of embodied memory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 1997

Aaron S. Benjamin  and
Robert A. Bjork
Aaron S. Benjamin
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1563 benjamin@psych.ucla.edurabjork@psych.ucla.edu
Robert A. Bjork
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1563 benjamin@psych.ucla.edurabjork@psych.ucla.edu
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Abstract

Glenberg's theory is rich and provocative, in our view, but we find fault with the premise that all memory representations are embodied. We cite instances in which that premise mispredicts empirical results or underestimates human capabilities, and we suggest that the motivation for the embodiment idea – to avoid the symbol-grounding problem – should not, ultimately, constrain psychological theorizing.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , March 1997 , pp. 20
Copyright
© 1997 Cambridge University Press

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