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Rational constructivism, statistical inference, and core cognition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 May 2011

Fei Xu
Fei Xu
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720. fei_xu@berkeley.eduhttp://babylab.berkeley.edu/
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Abstract

I make two points in this commentary on Carey (2009). First, it may be too soon to conclude that core cognition is innate. Recent advances in computational cognitive science and developmental psychology suggest possible mechanisms for developing inductive biases. Second, there is another possible answer to Fodor's challenge – if concepts are merely mental tokens, then cognitive scientists should spend their time on developing a theory of belief fixation instead.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 3 , June 2011 , pp. 151 - 152
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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