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Reasoning, argumentation, and cognition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 March 2011

Keith Frankish
Keith Frankish
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, The Open University, Milton Keynes MK7 6AA, United Kingdom. k.frankish@open.ac.ukhttp://www.open.ac.uk/Arts/philos/frankish.htm
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Abstract

This commentary does three things. First, it offers further support for the view that explicit reasoning evolved for public argumentation. Second, it suggests that promoting effective communication may not be the only, or even the main, function of public argumentation. Third, it argues that the data Mercier and Sperber (M&S) cite are compatible with the view that reasoning has subsequently been co-opted to play a role in individual cognition.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 2 , April 2011 , pp. 79 - 80
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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