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Self-deception: A paradox revisited

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 February 2011

Albert Bandura
Albert Bandura
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305. bandura@psych.stanford.eduwww.stanford.edu/dept/psychology/abandura
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Abstract

A major challenge to von Hippel & Trivers's evolutionary analysis of self-deception is the paradox that one cannot deceive oneself into believing something while simultaneously knowing it to be false. The authors use biased information seeking and processing as evidence that individuals knowingly convince themselves of the truth of their falsehood. Acting in ways that keep one uninformed about unwanted information is self-deception. Acting in selectively biasing and misinforming ways is self-bias.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 1 , February 2011 , pp. 16 - 17
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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