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Taking the rationality out of probabilistic models

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 August 2011

Bob Rehder
Bob Rehder
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY 10003. bob.rehder@nyu.eduwww.psych.nyu.edu/rehder/
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Abstract

Rational models vary in their goals and sources of justification. While the assumptions of some are grounded in the environment, those of others – which I label probabilistic models – are induced and so require more traditional sources of justification, such as generalizability to dissimilar tasks and making novel predictions. Their contribution to scientific understanding will remain uncertain until standards of evidence are clarified.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 4 , August 2011 , pp. 210 - 211
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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