Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-gvvz8 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T15:31:10.042Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The “trivial neuron doctrine” is not trivial

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 1999

Dale Jamieson
Dale Jamieson
Affiliation:
Environmental and Technology Studies Program and Department of Philosophy, Carleton College, Northfield, MN 55057 djamieson@carleton.edu www.dir.ucar.edu/esig/HP_dale.html
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

I argue that the trivial neuron doctrine as characterized by Gold & Stoljar is not trivial; it appears to be inconsistent with property dualism as well as some forms of functionalism and externalism. I suggest that the problem is not so much with the particular way in which Gold & Stoljar draw the distinction as with the unruliness of the distinction itself. Their failure to see this may be why they misunderstand the views of the Churchlands.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 22 , Issue 5 , October 1999 , pp. 841 - 842
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)