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Two conceptions of access-consciousness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 1997

Derek Browne
Derek Browne
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealandd.browne@phil.canterbury.ac.nz
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Abstract

Block's (1995) cognitive conception of consciousness might be introduced in the service of two different projects. In one, the explanatory gap between science and folklore remains. In the other, a reductive claim is advanced, but the intuitive idea of consciousness is abandoned.

Type
Continuing Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , March 1997 , pp. 147
Copyright
© 1997 Cambridge University Press

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