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Two kinds of access

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2008

Joseph Levine
Joseph Levine
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003-9269. jle@philos.umass.eduhttp://www.umass.edu/philosophy/faculty/levine.htm
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Abstract

I explore the implications of recognizing two forms of access that might be constitutively related to phenomenal consciousness. I argue, in support of Block, that we don't have good reason to think that the link to reporting mechanisms is the kind of access that distinguishes an experience from a mere state.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 5-6 , December 2007 , pp. 514 - 515
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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