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Undisputed norms and normal errors in human thinking

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 October 2011

Vittorio Girotto
Vittorio Girotto
Affiliation:
School of Arts and Design, University IUAV of Venice, 30123 Venice, Italy. vgirotto@iuav.ithttp://www.iuav.it/Ricerca1/Dipartimen/dADI/Docenti/girotto-vi/index.htm
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Abstract

This commentary questions Elqayam & Evans' (E&E's) claims that thinking tasks are doomed to have multiple normative readings and that only applied research allows normative evaluations. In fact, some tasks have just one undisputed normative reading, and not only pathological gamblers but also normal individuals sometimes need normative guidance. To conclude, normative evaluations are inevitable in the investigation of human thinking.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 5 , October 2011 , pp. 255 - 256
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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