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What we (don't) know about what we know

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2014

Shlomi Sher  and
Piotr Winkielman
Shlomi Sher
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Pomona College, Claremont, CA 91711 Shlomi.Sher@pomona.edu
Piotr Winkielman
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093-0109 pwinkielman@ucsd.edu http://psy2.ucsd.edu/~pwinkiel/ University of Social Sciences and Humanities, 03-815 Warsaw, Poland.
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Abstract

The hypothesis of unconscious influences on complex behavior is observationally equivalent to the dissociability of cognition and metacognition (reportability). The target article convincingly argues that evidence for unconscious influence is limited by the quality of the metacognitive measure used. However, it understates the empirical evidence for unconscious influences and overlooks considerations of cognitive architecture that make cognitive/metacognitive dissociations likely.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 37 , Issue 1 , February 2014 , pp. 38 - 39
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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