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When imagination is difficult: Metacognitive experiences at the fault lines of reality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2008

Lawrence J. Sanna
Lawrence J. Sanna
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of North Carolinaat Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3270. sanna@unc.eduhttp://www.unc.edu/~sanna
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Abstract

Imagination and rational thought may be guided by identical principles, and Byrne's (2005) analysis expertly synthesizes a diverse literature on counterfactual thinking. Further attention should be paid to metacognitive experiences, like ease or difficulty of thought generation, which accompany the imaginative process. Only by considering metacognitive experiences along with the content of what people imagine can we fully understand imagination.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 5-6 , December 2007 , pp. 464 - 465
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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