Movement time and accuracy, as defined by Plamondon & Alimi, do not conform to empirical definitions. When definitions are used that conform better to empirical ones, the original predictions of the kinematic theory are no longer valid – as is demonstrated by simulations. Thus the theoretically derived quadratic law and the successful empirical quadratic law seem to be independent of each other.

This commentary concentrates on two flaws in Mele's account. The first is Mele's attempt to account for self-deception by appealing to a desire to believe, together with an instrumental belief concerning the means of satisfying this desire. Contrary to Mele, it is argued that such an account requires a recognition on the part of agents that their actions instantiate these means. Second, Mele misidentifies the most essential – and flawed – ingredient of the standard approach to self-deception, the agent's desire to form the belief (the belief that is undermined by the evidence). This ingredient is retained in Mele's own account of self-deception.

It is important to study movement data from individual subjects rather than by averaging data across subjects or trials, because averaged data may follow different laws than those followed by the individual data. This fact can be shown mathematically. In addition, clear assumptions and a thorough understanding of their consequences are a necessary component of any realistic model.

There is little fear that the concept of motivational bias as proposed by Mele is likely to dampen the current academic ferment (see Mele's Introduction) with respect to self-deception for several reasons: (a) like philosophy, science has more recently abandoned the heuristic of a rational human mind; (b) the concept is parsimonious, applicable to many research topics other than self-deception, and, therefore, scientifically serviceable; (c) as a proximal mechanism it addresses process rather than function, that is, how rather than why questions; (d) it is not as interesting a question as why there is a high prevalence of “real” self-deception (i.e., “garden-variety self-deception” as described by Mele, see sect. 6); and (e) a more penetrating issue is whether “real” self-deception is adaptive.

A series of intriguing experiments has emphasized the need to understand synchronization effects. Information theory is proving to be an important tool for understanding the computations performed by cortical circuits. Nevertheless, Phillips & Singer's target article fails to provide a convincing correlation between synchronous firing and information transmission, which could well prove to be anticorrelated.

The distinction between receptive field and conceptual field is appealing and heuristically useful. Conceptually, it is more satisfactory to distinguish between information from the environment and from the brain. We emphasize here a selectionist view that considers information transmission within the brain as modulated by a stimulus, rather than information transmission from a stimulus as modulated by the context.

Plamondon & Alimi's derivation of the kinematic model is mathematically flawed. By simply naming a particular parameter combination “variability,” the model fails to explicate the sources of variability. As a result, the model cannot distinguish between various sources of error, such as those resulting from task demands and those resulting from movement execution.

Although Mele's four sufficient conditions for self-deception are on track insofar as they avoid the requirement that self-deception involves contradictory beliefs, they are too weak, because they are broad enough to include cases of bias or prejudice that are not typical cases of self-deception. I discuss what distinguishes self-deception from other forms of bias.

For scene analysis, it is important to ask the question of how synchronized population codes – the basic representation employed in the target article – are generated. Recent computational advances have resolved the critical challenges of rapid synchronization with local coupling and rapid desynchronization. The synchronized codes make real contributions to tackling the problem of scene analysis.

A purely kinematic theory of movement runs the risk of having no explanatory power because it neglects the internal generative structures of the central nervous system. Distributed interaction between the agonist and antagonist systems would better simulate physiological mechanisms of oscillation, lateral inhibition, and synchronization, all of which have important roles in motor control.

Contrary to Mele's suggestion, not all garden-variety self-deception reduces to bias-generated false beliefs (usually held contrary to the evidence). Many cases center around self-deceiving intentions to avoid painful topics, escape unpleasant truths, seek comfortable attitudes, and evade self-acknowledgment. These intentions do not imply paradoxical projects or contradictory belief states.

Simulations and analytic considerations show that synchronisation occurs in delay neural networks at the surrounds of externally driven sites. In the synchronous fields, network transmission has a static transfer function and H(X|R,C) is minimal. But when autonomous local states with attractor dynamics develop in the network, H(X|R,C) is not minimized. Physiological realism may therefore require some modifications in application of coherent infomax.

We address two main issues: the distinction between time-constrained and spatially constrained tasks, and the separable A and W effects on movement time (MT) in spatially- constrained tasks. We consider MT and 3-D kinematic data from human adults pointing to targets in human-computer interaction. These are better fit by Welford's (1968) two- part model, than Fitts' (1954; Fitts & Peterson 1964) ID model. We identify theoretical and practical implications.

An important way to become self-deceived, omitted by Mele, is by intentionally ignoring and avoiding the contemplation of evidence one has for an upsetting conclusion, knowing full well that one is giving priority to one's present peace of mind over the search for truth. Such intentional self-deception may be especially hard to observe scientifically.

The essence of a mental event such as self-deception lies in its function – its place in the life of an animal. But the function of self-deception corresponds to that of interpersonal deception. Therefore self-deception, contrary to Mele's thesis, is essentially isomorphic with interpersonal deception.

Fitts' law and the ΔΛ model are “weak” theories of motor control because they are limited to the kinematic aspects of movement and do not capture its essential dynamic nature. The internal source of “noise” that determines the speed/ accuracy trade-off can be associated with the partial compensation of movement-generated “parasitic” forces.

The usefulness of contextually guided processors is investigated a little further. A more general use for binding V1 cell responses than the one in Phillips & Singer's target article is proposed, which takes into account that strong responses of these cells can mean more than the presence of lines and edges. The possibility of different grouping depending on the activities of neighboring cells is essential to the approach.

The additional data, perspectives, questions, and criticisms contributed by the commentaries strengthen our view that local cortical processors coordinate their activity with the context in which it occurs using contextual fields and synchronized population codes. We therefore predict that whereas the specialization of function has been the keynote of this century the coordination of function will be the keynote of the next.

In Plamondon & Alimi's target article, a bell-shaped velocity profile typically observed in fast movements is used as a basis for the “kinematic theory” of motor control. In our opinion, kinematics is a necessary but insufficient ground for a theory of motor control. Relationships between different kinematic characteristics are an emergent property of the system dynamics controlled by the brain in a specific way. In particular, bell-shaped velocity profiles with or without additional waves are a trivial consequence of shifts in the equilibrium state of the system as suggested, for example, in the λ-model of motor control.

Mele questions the prevalence and ontological status of strong forms of self-deception, as well as our attempt at experimental demonstration. Without validated indicators outside laboratory contexts, statements about prevalence are purely speculative. Conceptualizing self-deception without positing the motivated lack of awareness of a contradictory belief is unsatisfactory in dealing with issues of “agency,” that is, how can we stop the processing of threatening information unless we recognize that the information is threatening?