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The Policy Basis of Government Coalitions: A Comparative Investigation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2009

Ian Budge  and
Michael Laver
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Extract

This article examines a key assumption of many approaches to the analysis of government coalitions, that parties are exclusively concerned with the achievement of immediate policy objectives. We first consider the extent to which policy considerations can be used to characterize coalitions formed in eight postwar democracies, using party election programmes to operationalize and test a variety of policy-based models of government formation. We then see what parties get from governments in terms of declared policy commitments, both in and out of office. The conclusion in both cases is that party policy clearly influences the formation of coalitions, but its impact is substantially modified by long-term structures and cleavages within different party systems.

Type
Articles
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 23 , Issue 4 , October 1993 , pp. 499 - 519
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1993

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References

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13 While possibly non-intuitive, the differential saliency of issues makes perfect sense in the context of party competition. On most issues (such as taxes, welfare, military strength) one party has clearly the most popular policy. It will seek to emphasize such issues to attract votes, but the most obvious tactic for rivals is to de-emphasize that issue in favour of the ones where they have the most popular policies. Empirical confirmation of this phenomenon can be found in: Robertson, David, A Theory of Party Competition (London: Wiley, 1976)Google Scholar: Budge, Ian and Farlie, D. J., Voting and Party Competition (London: Wiley, 1977)Google Scholar: Budge, Ian and Farlie, D. J., Explaining and Predicting Elections (London: Unwin, 1982)Google Scholar: Budge, , Robertson, and Hearl, , eds, Ideology, Strategy and Party MovementGoogle Scholar: Laver, and Budge, , eds, Party Policy and Government Coalitions.Google Scholar

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