Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 January 2009
Two competing themes – traditionalism and constitutional design – lead to inconsistency in F. A. Hayek's work. This inconsistency and its implications for understanding his thought are examined. It is shown that his failure to reconcile these conflicting emphases reflects uncertainty about the proportions of reasoned choice and unreflective rule-following in human decisions. This uncertainty is traced to Hayek's growing pessimism about modern man's ability to preserve the market and the traditions upon which the market rests. Once Hayek's pessimism is set aside, the implications of his work on tradition can be developed in a more useful direction. Realization that reason rests on a non-rational matrix and that people's choices affect that matrix should not lead towards embrace and veneration of the past, but towards emphasis on the necessity of responsible political choice in the present and future.
1 For discussion of this distinction, see Downing, L. and Thigpen, R., ‘Ideology and Truth-Seeking in Liberal Theory. The Case of Ackerman's Social Justice in the Liberal State’, Review of Politics, 46 (1984), 45–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2 Barry, N., ‘Hayek on Liberty’ in Gray, J. and Pelczynski, Z., eds, Conceptions of Liberty in Political Philosophy (London: Athlone Press, 1984).Google Scholar
3 Gray, J., ‘F. A. Hayek on Liberty and Tradition’, Journal of Libertarian Studies, 4 (1980), 119–37, p. 120.Google Scholar
4 Brittan, S., The Role and Limits of Government: Essays in Political Economy (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1983).Google Scholar
5 Gray, J., Hayek on Liberty (London: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 120.Google Scholar
6 Letwin, S., ‘The Achievement of Friedrich A. Hayek’, in Machlup, F., ed., Essays on Hayek (New York: New York University Press, 1976), 147–67.Google Scholar
7 Lowi, Theodore, The End of Liberalism (New York: Norton, 1969).Google Scholar
8 Hayek, F. A., The Political Order of a Free People (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 99.Google Scholar
9 Vaughn, K., ‘Can Democratic Society Reform Itself? The Limits of Constructive Change’ (paper presented to Mont Pélèrin Society, 09 1982).Google Scholar
10 Hayek, F. A., The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 36.Google Scholar
11 In this respect, Hayek's work can be usefully compared with that of Burke.
12 Hayek, F. A., The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944), pp. 17, 18.Google Scholar
13 Hayek, , Constitution of Liberty, p. 291.Google Scholar
14 Hayek, F. A., Rules and Order (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 5.Google Scholar
15 Hayek, , Constitution of Liberty, pp. 183–4.Google Scholar
16 Hayek, , Constitution of Liberty, p. 284.Google Scholar
17 Hayek, , Rules and Order, p. 3.Google Scholar
18 Hayek, , Political Order, p. 105.Google Scholar
19 Hayek, , Political Order, p. 152.Google Scholar
20 Barry, , ‘Hayek on Liberty’, p. 280.Google Scholar
21 Hayek, , Road to Serfdom, p. 166.Google Scholar
22 Hayek, , Rules and Order, p. 5.Google Scholar
23 Hayek, F. A., The Counter-Revolution of Science (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1979), p. 149.Google Scholar
24 Hayek, , Rules and Order, p. 6.Google Scholar
25 Hayek, F. A., Knowledge, Evolution, and Society (London: Adam Smith Institute, 1984), p. 56.Google Scholar
26 Hayek, , Rules and Order, p. 5.Google Scholar
27 Hayek, F. A., The Sensory Order: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Theoretical Psychology (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952).Google Scholar
28 Gray, , Hayek on Liberty, p. 24.Google Scholar
29 Hayek, F. A., The Mirage of Social Justice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 25Google Scholar; cited in Gray, , Hayek on Liberty, p. 24.Google Scholar
30 Gray, , Hayek on Liberty, pp. 24–5.Google Scholar
31 Hayek, F. A., Individualism and Economic Order (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 22, p. 19.Google Scholar
32 Hayek, F. A., New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics, and the History of Ideas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 234.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
33 Hayek, , The Political Order, p. 157.Google Scholar
34 Hayek, , The Political Order, pp. 162, 163.Google Scholar
35 Hayek, , The Political Order, p. 176.Google Scholar
36 Barrett, R., Culture and Conduct (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1984), p. 77.Google Scholar
37 Hayek, , The Political Order, p. 155.Google Scholar
38 Hayek, F. A., Studies in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 111.Google Scholar
39 Hayek, , The Political Order, p. 155.Google Scholar
40 Hayek, , The Political Order, p. 161.Google Scholar
41 These controversies are addressed in Rowland, B., Ordered Liberty and the Constitutional Framework: The Political Thought of Friedrich A. Hayek (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1987).Google Scholar
42 Hayek, , The Political Order, p. 157.Google Scholar
43 Hayek, , Constitution of Liberty, pp. 398, 394.Google Scholar
44 Hayek, , The Political Order, p. 169.Google Scholar
45 Hayek, , The Political Order, p. 168.Google Scholar
46 Hayek, , The Political Order, pp. 160, 163.Google Scholar
47 Hayek, , Individualism, p. 24, n. 23.Google Scholar
48 Hayek, , Constitution of Liberty, p. 399.Google Scholar
49 Hayek, , Individualism, p. 8.Google Scholar
50 Hayek, , The Political Order, p. 105.Google Scholar
51 Hayek, , The Political Order, p. 105.Google Scholar
52 Hayek, , New Studies, p. 96.Google Scholar
53 Hayek, , Rules and Order, p. 56.Google Scholar
54 Hayek, , Road to Serfdom, p. 240.Google Scholar
55 Hayek, , Rules and Order, p. 4.Google Scholar
56 Hayek, , Constitution of Liberty, p. 11.Google Scholar
57 Hayek, , Constitution of Liberty, p. 11.Google Scholar
58 See Hamowy, Ronald, ‘Law and the Liberal Society: F. A. Hayek's Constitution of Liberty’, Journal of Libertarian Studies, 2 (1978), 287–97.Google Scholar
59 Brittan, , The Role and Limits of Government, p. 63.Google Scholar
60 Hayek, , Constitution of Liberty, p. 12.Google Scholar
61 Hayek, , Constitution of Liberty, pp. 12–13.Google Scholar
62 Hayek, , Constitution of Liberty, p. 6.Google Scholar
63 Hayek, , Road to Serfdom, p. 212.Google Scholar
64 Hayek, , Constitution of Liberty, p. 13.Google Scholar
65 Hayek, , Constitution of Liberty, pp. 261, 263, 287, 292, 342, 355, 365.Google Scholar
66 Hayek, , Knowledge, Evolution, and Society, pp. 40, 46, 56.Google Scholar
67 Hayek, , Road to Serfdom, p. 17.Google Scholar
68 Hayek, , Individualism, p. 19.Google Scholar
69 Hayek, , Road to Serfdom, p. 17.Google Scholar
70 Barry, , ‘Hayek on Liberty’, p. 280.Google Scholar
71 Hayek, , Road to Serfdom, p. 164.Google Scholar
72 Hayek, , Road to Serfdom, p. 212.Google Scholar
73 Hayek, , Knowledge, Evolution, and Society, p. 55.Google Scholar
74 Hayek, , Knowledge, Evolution, and Society, p. 43.Google Scholar
75 Hayek, , Knowledge, Evolution, and Society, p. 48.Google Scholar
76 Hayek, , Knowledge, Evolution, and Society, p. 44.Google Scholar
77 Hayek, , Studies, p. 194.Google Scholar
78 Hayek, , The Mirage of Social Justice, p. 74.Google Scholar
79 Hayek, , Political Order, p. 167.Google Scholar
80 Hayek, F. A., ‘The Origins and Effects of our Morals: a Problem for Science’, in Nishiyama, C. and Leube, K., eds, The Essence of Hayek (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1984), p. 330.Google Scholar
81 Hayek, , ‘The Origins and Effects’, p. 318.Google Scholar
82 It might be argued that this depends on the sense in which individualism is being used. In Hayek's ontological perspective, all social action is individual action, even if it is difficult to explain particular phenomena in terms of individual actions. My own position here – and a central idea in this article – is that Hayek loses sight of his initial ontological position, leading him towards a conservative, almost mystical position regarding tradition. While one may not be able to explain the content of tradition as the result of particular individual choices, it nevertheless remains true that it is only through the acts and words of human agents that tradition exists. Hayek's fear of choices hostile to the traditions he defends prevents him from developing important implications of his ontological individualism.
83 This position on the content of tacit knowledge in a liberal society is controversial. Many analysts of liberalism argue that the liberal tradition lacks a conception of the good or of individual virtue. While space does not allow discussion of the controversy here, recent work challenges the ‘neutral’ conception of the liberal tradition. William Galston, for example, maintains that liberalism rests upon and, indeed, requires some degree of character or virtue in its citizenry. (See, for discussion, Galston's paper, ‘Liberal Virtues’, delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1987. I cite this paper with Professor Galston's kind permission.) My position is that ideas about that liberal character, and how it is to be attained, form a part of the tacit knowledge of individuals in liberal societies. The tacit nature of these ideas may account for the limited attention they have received from contemporary liberals.
84 Kitwood, T., ‘“Personal Identity” and Personal Integrity’, in Weinreich-Haste, H. and Locke, D., eds, Morality in the Making (New York: Wiley, 1983), p. 228.Google Scholar
85 Hayek, , Rules and Order, p. 69.Google Scholar
86 Shils, E., Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 205.Google Scholar
87 Barrett, , Culture and Conduct, p. 73.Google Scholar
88 MacIntyre, A., After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), p. 222.Google Scholar
89 Barrett, , Culture and Conduct, p. 213.Google Scholar
90 Barrett, , Culture and Conduct, p. 211.Google Scholar
91 Hayek, , Political Order, p. 167.Google Scholar
92 Hayek, , Road to Serfdom, p. 212.Google Scholar
93 Simon, Herbert A., ‘Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science’, American Political Science Review, 79 (1985), 293–304, p. 301.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
94 Goody, J., ‘Literacy and Moral Rationality’, in Stent, G., ed., Morality as a Biological Phenomenon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).Google Scholar
95 Markl, H., ‘Report on Group Discussion’Google Scholar, in Stent, , ed., Morality as a Biological Phenomenon, p. 226.Google Scholar
96 Simon, , ‘Human Nature in Politics’, p. 302.Google Scholar