Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 May 2011
Research suggests that the costs of international conflict (e.g. casualties) alter public opinion, executive approval and policy positions of elected officials. However, do casualties affect voting in terms of aggregate outcomes and individual vote choices? This article examines how casualties from interstate conflicts affect voter behaviour, specifically incumbent vote share. Using the investment model of commitment to model individual vote choice, it is argued that increases in the costs of conflict (i.e., more casualties) can increase the probability that voters will support the incumbent, increasing incumbent vote share. This model is tested with both cross-national aggregate data from twenty-three countries and individual-level British survey data. The results support the argument.
1 Rusbult, Carly, ‘Commitment and Satisfaction in Romantic Associations: A Test of the Investment Model’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 16 (1980), 172–186CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
2 Gartner, Scott S., ‘The Multiple Effects of Casualties on Public Support for War: An Experimental Approach’, American Political Science Review, 102 (2008), 95–106CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gartner, Scott S. and Segura, Gary M., ‘War, Casualties and Public Opinion’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42 (1998), 278–300CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hibbs, Douglas A., ‘President Reagan's Mandate from the 1980 Elections: A Shift to the Right?’ American Politics Quarterly, 10 (1982), 387–420CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Larson, Eric V., Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Wars and Military Operation (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1996)Google Scholar; Mueller, John, War, Presidents and Public Opinion (New York: John Wiley,1973)Google Scholar.
3 Gartner, Scott S. and Segura, Gary M., ‘All Politics Are Still Local: The Iraq War and the 2006 Midterm Elections’, PS: Political Science & Politics, 41 (2008), 95–100Google Scholar.
4 Gartner and Segura, ‘War, Casualties and Public Opinion’; Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion; Mueller, John, ‘The Iraq Syndrome’, Foreign Affairs, 84 (2005), 44–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
5 Carson, Jamie, Jenkins, Jeffrey, Rohde, David and Souva, Mark, ‘The Impact of National Tides and District-Level Effects on Electoral Outcomes: The U.S. Congressional Elections of 1862–63’, American Journal of Political Science, 45 (2001), 887–898CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gartner, Scott S., Segura, Gary M. and Barratt, Bethany,‘War Casualties, Policy Positions, and the Fate of Legislators’, Political Research Quarterly, 53 (2004), 467–477CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
6 Gelpi, Christopher, Reifler, Jason and Feaver, Peter D., ‘Iraq the Vote: Retrospective and Prospective Foreign Policy Judgments on Candidate Choice and Casualty Tolerance’, Political Behavior, 29 (2007), 151–174CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gelpi, Christopher, Feaver, Peter D. and Reifler, Jason, Paying the Human Costs of War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Berinsky, Adam J., ‘Assuming the Costs of War: Events, Elites, and American Public Support for Military Conflict’, Journal of Politics, 69 (2007), 975–997CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Berinsky, Adam J., In Time of War: Understanding American Public Opinion from World War II to Iraq (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
7 Gelpi, , Reifler, and Feaver, , ‘Iraq the Vote’, p. 151Google Scholar.
8 Berinsky, In Time of War.
9 Zaller, John, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
10 Berinsky, , In Time of War, p. 72Google Scholar.
11 Grose, Christian and Oppenheimer, Bruce, ‘The Iraq War, Partisanship, and Candidate Attributes: Explaining Variation in Partisan Swing in the 2006 U.S. House Elections’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 32 (2007), 531–558CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
12 Grose, Christian, Malhotra, Neil and Oppenheimer, Bruce, ‘Issue Voting, Iraq War Casualties, and the 2006 Election: Who Gets the Blame and Who Gets the Credit?’ (unpublished, see http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/apw/archives/oppenheimer.pdf)Google Scholar.
13 Kriner, Douglas and Shen, Francis, ‘Iraq Casualties and the 2006 Senate Elections’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 32 (2007), 507–530CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
15 Norpoth, Helmut and Sidman, Andrew H., ‘Mission Accomplished: The Wartime Election of 2004’, Journal of Political Behavior, 29 (2007), 175–195CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
16 Karol, David and Miguel, Edward, ‘The Electoral Cost of War: Iraq Casualties and the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election’, Journal of Politics, 69 (2007), 633–648CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
17 Rusbult, ‘Commitment and Satisfaction in Romantic Associations’; for an application in international relations, see: Hoffman, Aaron, Agnew, Christopher R., Lehmiller, Justin J. and Duncan, Natasha T., ‘Satisfaction, Alternatives, Investments, and the Micro-foundations of Audience Cost Models’, International Interactions, 35 (2009), 365–389CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
18 Hoffman et al., ‘Satisfaction, Alternatives, Investments, and the Micro-foundations of Audience Cost Models’.
19 Goodfriend, Wind and Agnew, Christopher, ‘Sunken Costs and Desired Plans: Examining Different Types of Investments in Close Relationships’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34 (2008), 1639–1652CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Le, Benjamin and Agnew, Christopher, ‘Commitment and its Theorized Determinants: A Meta-analysis of the Investment Model’, Personal Relationships, 10 (2003), 37–57CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
20 Rusbult, ‘Commitment and Satisfaction in Romantic Associations’.
21 Nincic, Donna J. and Nincic, Miroslav, ‘Commitment to Military Intervention: The Democratic Government as Economic Investor’, Journal of Peace Research, 32 (1995), 413–426CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
22 Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion.
23 Nincic, and Nincic, , ‘Commitment to Military Intervention’, p. 415Google Scholar.
24 Nincic and Nincic, ‘Commitment to Military Intervention’.
25 Nincic and Nincic, ‘Commitment to Military Intervention’.
26 Boettcher, William A. III and Cobb, Michael D., ‘Don't Let Them Die in Vain; Casualty Frames and Public Tolerance for Escalating Commitment in Iraq’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53 (2009), 677–697CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
27 Sullivan, Patricia, ‘Sustaining the Fight: A Cross-Sectional Time-Series Analysis of Public Support for Ongoing Military Interventions’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 25 (2008), 112–135CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tomz, Michael, ‘Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach’, International Organization, 61 (2007), 821–840CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hoffman, Agnew, Lehmiller and Duncan, ‘Satisfaction, Alternatives, Investments’.
28 Sullivan, , ‘Sustaining the Fight’, p.129Google Scholar.
29 Tomz, ‘Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations’.
30 Campbell, Angus, Converse, Philip E., Miller, Warren E. and Stokes, Donald E., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960)Google Scholar.
31 Wlezien, Christopher, Franklin, Mark and Twiggs, Daniel, ‘Economic Perceptions and Vote Choice: Disentangling the Endogeneity’, Political Behavior, 19 (1997), 7–17CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
32 Wlezien, Franklin and Twiggs, ‘Economic Perceptions and Vote Choice’; Conover, Pamela, Feldman, Stanley and Knight, Kathleen, ‘The Personal and Political Underpinnings of Economic Forecasts’, American Journal of Political Science, 31 (1987), 559–583CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Macdonald, Kenneth and Heath, Anthony, ‘Pooling Cross-sections: A Comment on Price and Sander’, Political Studies, 45 (1997), 928–941CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Nannestad, Peter and Paldam, Martin, ‘Into Pandora's Box of Economic Valuations: A Study of the Danish Macro VP-function, 1986–1997’, Electoral Studies, 19 (2000), 123–140CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Anderson, Christopher, Mendes, Silvia M. and Tverdovaa, Yuliya V., ‘Endogenous Economic Voting: Evidence from the 1997 British Election’, Electoral Studies, 23 (2004), 683–708CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
33 Anderson, Mendes and Tverdovaa, ‘Endogenous Economic Voting’.
34 Berinsky, Adam and Druckman, James, ‘Public Opinion Research and Support for the War’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 71 (2007), 126–141CrossRefGoogle Scholar, p. 139.
35 Keith, Bruce E., Magleby, David B., Nelson, Candice J., Orr, Elizabeth and Westlye, Mark C., The Myth of the Independent Voter (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992)Google Scholar; Petrocik, John R., ‘Measuring Party Support: Leaners are not Independents’, Electoral Studies, 28 (2009), 562–572CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
36 Basinger, Scott J. and Lavine, Howard, ‘Ambivalence, Information, and Electoral Choice’, American Political Science Review, 99 (2005), 169–184CrossRefGoogle Scholar, p. 180.
37 Green, Jane, ‘When Voters and Parties Agree: Valence Issues and Party Competition’, Political Studies, 55 (2007), 629–655CrossRefGoogle Scholar, p. 650; Enelow, James and Hinich, Melvin J., The Spatial Theory of Voting: An Introduction (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984)Google Scholar; Bernhard, Michael and Ingberman, Dan, ‘Candidate Reputations and the Incumbency Effect’, Journal of Public Economics, 27 (1985), 47–67CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
38 Merolla, Jennifer L., Ramos, Jennifer M. and Zechmeister, Elizabeth J., ‘Crisis, Charisma, and Consequences: Evidence from the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election’, Journal of Politics, 69 (2007), 30–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
39 Ansolabehere, Stephen D., Snyder, James M. Jr and Stewart, Charles III, ‘Candidate Positioning in US House Elections’, American Journal of Political Science, 45 (2001), 136–159CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Groseclose, Tim, ‘A Model of Candidate Location When One Candidate Has a Valence Advantage’, American Journal of Political Science, 45 (2001), 862–886CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
40 Moen, Espen R. and Riis, Christian ‘Policy Reversal’, American Economic Review, 100 (2010), 1261–1268CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
41 Merolla, Ramos and Zechmeister, ‘Crisis, Charisma, and Consequences’.
42 McGovern took this position in the US presidential election in 1972 and was soundly defeated by Nixon.
43 Glazer, Amihai and Lohmann, Susanne, ‘Setting the Agenda: Electoral Competition, Commitment of Policy and Issue Salience’, Public Choice, 99 (1999), 377–394CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
44 Exceptions to this are the US presidential elections of 1952 and 1968 and, to a lesser extent, the 2008 election. In both 1952 and 1968, the incumbent did not run for re-election. In 1952, Stevenson was unable to mount a convincing counter to Eisenhower's campaign about ending the Korean conflict. This coupled with Eisenhower's two other ‘C's’, Communism and Corruption, made the election difficult for the Democrats to retain the office of the president. In 1968, both candidates, Nixon and Humphrey, promised a similar winding down of the conflict. However, Nixon's plan of ‘peace with honour’ coupled with his reputation as tough on communism and, more importantly, his promise to restore ‘law and order’ won out over Humphrey's campaign. Finally, in the 2008 election, the incumbent George W. Bush was termed out of office. While the Democratic candidate, Barack Obama, highlighted his initial opposition to the conflict, he did not purpose an immediate and unilateral withdrawal. Conversely, while Republican candidate John McCain took credit for supporting the troop surge in 2007, he also stated that US troops could remain in Iraq for fifty to 100 years. Furthermore, the incumbent party, the Republican party, faced a rapidly deteriorating economy and was riddled by scandal.
45 Weisberg, Herbert and Christenson, Dino, ‘Changing Horses in Wartime? The 2004 Presidential Election’, Journal of Political Behavior, 29 (2007), 279–304CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
46 Keith et al., The Myth of the Independent Voter.
47 Dennis, Jack, ‘Political Independence in America, Part II: Towards a Theory’, British Journal of Political Science, 18 (1988), 197–219CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
48 Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler, Paying the Human Costs of War.
49 Gelpi, , Feaver, and Reifler, , Paying the Human Costs of War, p. 141Google Scholar, fn 25.
50 An election cycle spans from the end of one election to either the next mandated election or the next called election. I understand that these may vary both between and within countries. To account for this, I include the CIEP measure and use fixed effects.
51 I employ logged casualties because I do not examine marginal changes in casualty rates.
52 Petter Gleditsch, Nils, Strand, Håvard, Eriksson, Mikael, Sollenberg, Margareta and Wallensteen, Peter, ‘Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset’, Journal of Peace Research, 39 (2002), 615–637CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
53 While many conflicts began and ended within an election cycle, others did not. Subsequently, I used secondary sources either to determine the casualties within the election cycle or to determine when the bulk of the fighting occurred and apportioned the PRIO determined casualties accordingly.
54 Gartner and Segura, ‘War, Casualties and Public Opinion’; Larson, Casualties and Consensus’; Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion.
55 Gartner and Segura, ‘War, Casualties and Public Opinion’.
56 Blainey, Geoffrey, The Causes of War (New York: The Free Press, 1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
57 I estimated the models using the duration of the longest conflict during the election cycle. The results did not change.
58 Sartori, Giovanni, Parties and Party Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976)Google Scholar; Carey, John and Shugart, Matthew, ‘Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas’, Electoral Studies, 14 (1995), 417–439CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Huber, John, Kernell, Georgia and Leoni, Eduardo L., ‘Institutional Context, Cognitive Resources and Party Attachments Across Democracies’, Political Analysis, 13 (2005), 365–386CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Palmer, Harvey and Whitten, Guy D., ‘Economics, Politics, and the Cost of Ruling in Advanced Industrial Democracies: How Much Does Context Matter?’ in Han Dorussen and Michael Taylor, eds, Economic Voting (New York: Routledge, 2002)Google Scholar.
59 Huber, Kernell and Leoni, ‘Institutional Context, Cognitive Resources and Party Attachments’.
60 Fair, Ray, ‘The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for President’, Review of Economics and Statistics, 60 (1978), 159–173CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
61 Palmer and Whitten, ‘Economics, Politics, and the Cost of Ruling in Advanced Industrial Democracies’.
62 Goemans, Hein, Gleditsch, Kristian S. and Chiozza, Giacomo, ‘Introducing Archigos: A Data Set of Political Leaders’, Journal of Peace Research, 45 (2009), 237–251Google Scholar.
63 Economic data are from the International Labour Organization and the World Bank for various years.
64 Basinger and Lavine, ‘Ambivalence, Information, and Electoral Choice’; Kam, Cindy, ‘Who Toes the Party Line? Cues, Values, and Individual Differences’, Political Behavior, 27 (2006), 163–182CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
65 One aspect of the British electorate that differs from the American electorate is the existence of parties beyond the two major left and right parties. This affects the number of pure independents in the sample, which is rather small (less than 4 per cent).
66 Conflict related data are from the British Ministry of Defence, see http://www.mod.uk.
67 Whitten, Guy D. and Palmer, Harvey D., ‘Cross-National Analyses of Economic Voting’, Electoral Studies, 18 (1999), 49–67CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
68 British unemployment and inflation data are from National Statistics online, http://www.statistics.gov.uk.
69 Chiozza, Giacomo and Goemans, Hein, ‘International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders: Is War Still ‘Ex Post’ Inefficient?’ American Journal of Political Science, 48 (2004), 604–619Google Scholar.
70 Aragonès, Enriqueta, ‘Negativity Effect and the Emergence of Ideologies’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 9 (1997), 198–210CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
71 The positive coefficient on the casualty measure is because 46 per cent of those categorized as strong partisans are self-identified Labour supporters, while only 31 per cent are Conservative supporters.
72 Except for the casualty measure and the interactions with the weak party measures, all other measures are held at their mean, median or modal values depending on whether the variable is continuous, ordinal or categorical.
73 The same pattern that emerges for weak Liberal Democrats in terms of a positive shift in incumbent voting also exists for the Plaid Cymru, Scottish National Party and Green Party identifiers. These figures are available from the author upon request.
74 Sullivan, ‘Sustaining the Fight’.
75 Gartner ,‘The Multiple Effects of Casualties on Public Support for War’.
76 See Boettcher and Cobb, ‘Don't Let Them Die in Vain’.
77 Downs, George W. and Rocke, David M., ‘Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for Resurrection: The Principal Agent Problem Goes to War’, American Journal of Political Science, 38 (1994), 362–380CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
78 Williams, Laron K., Brulé, David and Koch, Michael T., ‘War Voting: Interstate Disputes, the Economy, and Electoral Outcomes’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 27 (2010), 442–460CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
79 Gelpi, Christopher, Feaver, Peter D. and Reifler, Jason, ‘Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq’, International Security, 30 (2006), 7–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Berinsky, ‘Assuming the Costs of War’.
80 Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler, ‘Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq’.
81 Levy, Jack S., ‘Applications of Prospect Theory to Political Science’, Synthese, 135 (2003), 215–241CrossRefGoogle Scholar.