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Conditions Favouring Parties of the Extreme Right in Western Europe

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2009

Robert W. Jackman  and
Karin Volpert
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Extract

We examine the systemic conditions that have influenced the electoral success of parties of the extreme right in West European politics from 1970 through 1990. Empirical estimates based on 103 elections in sixteen countries suggest that electoral and party-system factors interact with each other to generate conditions conducive to these parties. Specifically, increasing electoral thresholds dampen support for the extreme right as the number of parliamentary parties expands. At the same time, multi-partism increasingly fosters parties of the extreme right with rising electoral proportionality. Our analyses also indicate that higher rates of unemployment provide a favourable environment for these political movements. These results suggest that levels of electoral support for the extreme right are sensitive to factors that can be modified through policy instruments.

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Articles
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 26 , Issue 4 , October 1996 , pp. 501 - 521
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1996

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References

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57 At first sight, the results from the 1994 general election in Italy might seem to contradict our argument, given the success of the National Alliance (successor to the MSI) following electoral reforms designed to restrict smaller parties. However, it is important to note that, because of the reforms, the National Alliance formed a pre-election coalition with the Northern League and Forza Italia which allowed them, among other things, to field joint candidates throughout Italy (on these developments, see ‘The rise of Italy's right’, The Economist, 19 02 1994, pp. 55–6Google Scholar). The reforms themselves are discussed in ‘Italy: Rules of the new game’, The Economist, 26 06 1993, pp. 56–8Google Scholar, and by Calise, Mauro, ‘Remaking the Italian Party System: How Lijphart Got It Wrong by Saying It Right’, West European Politics, 16 (1993), 545–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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