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Is ‘Power’ Essentially Contested?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2009

K. I. Macdonald
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Extract

The proper role of the values of the doer in the doing of political theory is a continuing and vexed problem. Is the holding of values an encumbrance or an integral part of the process? Recently Lukes has made a determined effort to argue, in the case of one particular concept, ‘power’, that theoretical and value disputes cannot in principle be disentangled: ‘I shall argue for a view of power (that is, a way of identifying it) which is radical in both the theoretical and political senses (and I take these senses in this context to be intimately related). The view I shall defend is… ineradicably evaluative and “essentially contested”.’ The notion of ‘essentially contested’ is defined by reference to Gallie, and although the above quotation may be ambiguous, Lukes' later usage makes clear that he is claiming that it is the concept of power (and not his metatheoretic statement about it) that is ‘essentially contested’. This claim is technically mistaken and the mistake, I would argue, is substantively pernicious.

Type
Notes and Comments
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 6 , Issue 3 , July 1976 , pp. 380 - 382
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1976

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References

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