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Legislative Procedures in the European Union: An Empirical Analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 September 2001

GEORGE TSEBELIS ,
CHRISTIAN B. JENSEN ,
ANASTASSIOS KALANDRAKIS  and
AMIE KREPPEL
GEORGE TSEBELIS
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles
CHRISTIAN B. JENSEN
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles
ANASTASSIOS KALANDRAKIS
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Yale University
AMIE KREPPEL
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of Florida, Gainsville.
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Abstract

The article analyses the role of the Commission, the Parliament, and the Council in the two main legislative procedures in the European Union: co-operation and co-decision (I). We use the legislative history of some 5,000 parliamentary amendments. These procedures have been the subject of a great deal of theoretical debate. According to conventional wisdom the co-decision procedure increases the powers of the European Parliament. Revisionist approaches, however, suggest that the conditional agenda-setting powers accorded to the Parliament by the co-operation procedure are more important than the veto powers ascribed by co-decision.

Type
Research Article
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 31 , Issue 4 , October 2001 , pp. 573 - 599
Copyright
© 2001 Cambridge University Press

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