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Linking and Integrating Corporatism and Consensus Democracy: Theory, Concepts and Evidence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2009

Markus M. L. Crepaz  and
Arend Lijphart
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Extract

Hans Keman's and Paul Pennings's critique (‘Managing Political and Societal Conflict in Democracies: Do Consensus and Corporatism Matter?’, this Journal, preceding pages) of our attempt to link corporatism and consensus democracy falls essentially into three parts. Their first criticism deals with the way we measured corporatism. They reject our ‘composite’ approach on the basis that different experts have different conceptual understandings of corporatism. Hence, they argue, it is unwarranted to add up these various scores. Secondly, they claim that our central relationship between consensus democracy and corporatism is a function of our particular measure of corporatism and, in addition, driven by two outlying cases: Italy and Austria. Thirdly, they claim that corporatism and consensus democracy are two different phenomena, and that therefore, corporatism should not be integrated into the concept of consensus democracy. We shall address these three main criticisms in the order described.

Type
Notes and Comments
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 25 , Issue 2 , April 1995 , pp. 281 - 288
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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References

1 Schmilter, Phillippe C., ‘Reflections on Where the Theory of Neo-Corporatism Has Gone and Where the Praxis of Neo-Corporatism May Be Going’, in Lehmbruch, Gerhard and Schmitter, Phillippe C., eds. Patterns of Corporatist Policy Making (London: Sage, 1982).Google Scholar

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3 For example, Lehmbruch, Gerhard, ‘Concertation and the Structure of Corporalist Networks’, in Goldthrope, John H., ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 60–80 at p. 62Google Scholar, defines corporatist concertation as having two essential features: first, ‘it involves not just a single organized interest with privileged access to government but rather a plurality of organizations usually representing antagonistic interests; and second, these organizations manage their conflicts and co-ordinate their action with that of government expressly in regard to the systemic (gesamtwirtschaftliche) requirements of the national economy’. Katzenstein, Peter's (Small States in World Markets. Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 32)Google Scholar definition of ‘social partnership’ seems to be closely related to Lehmbruch's notion of concertation: ‘This ideology [social partnership] mitigates class conflict between business and unions; it integrates differing conceptions of group interest with vaguely held notions of the public interest’.

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7 Latest scores used by Keman, Hans, obtained by personal communication in 1994.Google Scholar

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16 We used the conventional 0.05 (two-tailed t-test) as a cut-off point to determine outliers. Since residuals do not follow a hypothesized direction, two-tailed t-tests are appropriate. The two-tailed t-value for 16 degrees of freedom is ± 2.120 at the 0.05 level. Only Austria's studentized residual exceeds this critical cut-off point.

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19 As indicated above, Italy's sludentized residual value (– 1.963) does not exceed the critical cut-off point of ± 2.12 (two-tailed, 16 degrees of freedom, at the 0.05 level), which does not qualify it for an outlier. However, since Keman and Pennings argue that Italy is an outlier, and since Italy is close to the cut-off point, we decided to report the effects of Italy's omission individually and in conjunction with Austria on the parameter estimates.

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