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The Machiavellian Budgeter

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2009

Andrew T. Cowart
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Extract

Some political theorists maintain that Niccolò Machiavelli was a rather immoral sort. His exhortations to guile, perfidy, deception and opportunism were numerous, his scruples few. Others, in a more revisionist vein, suggest that his preferred tactics were only meant for the common good. Yet, whether Machiavelli was a scientist, a descriptivist, a technician, a moralist or an immoralist is immaterial from one standpoint: he taught us something about the nature of human interaction in the State. Machiavellian interpretations of human events underlie many of our personal impressions of political life. We speak of strategy, tactics, morality, honesty as if the locations of political leaders along those dimensions determine what governments do for us or to us.

Type
Articles
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 6 , Issue 1 , January 1976 , pp. 33 - 41
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1976

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References

1 There is no substitute for reading the originals: Machiavelli, Niccolò, The Prince, The Discourses (New York: Modern Library, 1940)Google Scholar. Particularly insightful discussions and analyses of these works are to be found in Jensen, De Lamar, ed. Machiavelli: Cynic, Patriot, or Political Scientist? (Boston, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1960)Google Scholar and Fleisher, Martin, ed., Machiavelli and the Nature of Political Thought (New York: Atheneum, 1972).Google Scholar

2 Certainly Wildavsky's original work began this line of analysis: Wildavsky, Aaror, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1964)Google Scholar. Much subsequent work on budgeting, however, hinges directly or indirectly on the concept of strategy: Davis, Otto A., Dempster, M. A. H., and Wildavsky, Aaron, ‘A Theory of the Budgetary Process’, American Political Science Review, LX (1966), 529–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cowart, Andrew T., Hansen, Tore, and Brofoss, Karl-Erik, ‘Budgetary Strategies and Success at Multiple Decision Levels in the Norwegian Urban Setting’, American Political Science Review, LXIX (1975), 543–57CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Crecine, John P., Governmental Problem-Solving: A Computer Simulation of Municipal Budgeting (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969)Google Scholar; Sharkansky, Ira, ‘Agency Requests, Gubernatorial Support, and Budget Success in State Legislatures’, American Political Science Review, LXII (1968), 1220–31CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lord, Guy, The French Budgetary Process (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).Google Scholar

3 See in particular Christie, Richard and Geis, Florence L., Studies in Machiavellianism (New York and London: Academic Press, 1970)Google Scholar and Guterman, Stanley S., The Machiavellians: A Social Psychological Study of Moral Character and Organizational Milieu (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970).Google Scholar

4 Christie, and Geis, , Studies in Machiavellianism, Chaps, 1 and 2.Google Scholar

5 For more detailed descriptions of study design and results, see Cowart, , Hansen, and Brofoss, , ‘Budgetary Strategies and Success at Multiple Decision Levels in the Norwegian Urban Setting’Google Scholar, and Cowart, , ‘Partisan Politics and the Budgetary Process in Oslo’, American Journal of Political Science, xix (1975).Google Scholar

6 There is an element of inconclusiveness in most factor analyses of this kind. The factor scores for individuals are determined, by and large, by responses to the five items with moderate to strong loadings on Factor I. The first factor is assumed to constitute the most meaningful measure of Machiavellian orientations because (i) the eigenvalue exceeds those for remaining factors by a sizeable quantity and (2) more of the individual items load significantly on that factor than on any other. Nonetheless, I have examined the validity of the inferences drawn in this paper by utilizing an alternative additive index for the nine items. While the differences are not nearly so sharp for the simple additive index, the conclusions drawn do not differ in any fundamental sense.

7 The question of why moderate Machiavellians are somewhat more acquisitive than are high Machiavellians is an interesting one. Several plausible – though speculative – interpretations suggest themselves. First, the answer may hinge upon which point along the scale really distinguishes the Machiavellian from the non-Machiavellian. It may be that the crucial distinction lies in the movement from a low to a moderate Machiavellian position and that changes beyond that point are simply random fluctuations. Second, the problem may be one of response reliability. The moderate Machiavellians may be the ‘real’ high Machiavellians, but in true Machiavellian style they refuse to reveal their orientation in questionnaires of this sort. Third, as superiors have come to perceive the high Machiavellians as such, resulting severe treatment of the high Machs by superiors may have had a depressing effect on behavior. While sufficient data are not available to assess the validity of these alternative explanations, the marked differences between the low and moderate Machs seem sufficient to allow the analysis to proceed.

8 Cowart, , Hansen, and Brofoss, , ‘Budgetary Strategies and Success at Multiple Decision Levels in the Norwegian Urban Setting’.Google Scholar

9 Wildavsky, , The Politics of the Budgetary Process, Chaps. 2 and 3.Google Scholar