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Mass Constraints on Political Realignments: Perceptions of Anti-System Parties in Italy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2009

Giacomo Sani
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Extract

Coalition phenomena are at the heart of politics everywhere, but they acquire a special significance in fragmented multiparty systems. In these systems, the distribution of political forces is such that parties are compelled to seek out at least one and often two or more partners, depending on the level of the system's fragmentation. The existence of a structural constraint that forces co-operative interaction is a major distinguishing feature of these systems and, accordingly, coalition-related phenomena occupy a central position in the political process. Coalition-maintenance activities are prominent, debates over coalition alternatives are frequent, procedures for the resolution of cabinet crises become institutionalized, and appropriate general orientations develop both at the level of the specialized actors in the political system and of the citizenry.

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Articles
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 6 , Issue 1 , January 1976 , pp. 1 - 32
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1976

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References

1 This appears to be the common finding of the voluminous literature on comparative political behavior.

2 The words are those of Sartori, Giovanni, ‘The Case of Polarized Pluralism’, in La-Palombara, Joseph and Weiner, Myron. eds., Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 147.Google Scholar

3 The Republican party (PRI) that was also part of the Committee of National Liberation steadfastly refused to collaborate with the monarchy. It joined the other parties after the referendum of 2 June 1946.

4 Between 1955 and 1960 DC minority cabinets leaned alternately to the left and to the right, a reflection of the deep splits within the Christian Democratic party. Cabinets led by Segni, Zoli and Tambroni and benefiting from the support of liberals, monarchists and neo-fascists were however considered to be ‘transitional governments’. A center-right, ‘organic’ alliance was never formalized. For a description of the events of those years, see Mammarella, Giuseppe, L'Italia dopo il fascismo: 1943–1968 (Bologna: II Mulino, 1970).Google Scholar

5 The precise date of the beginning of the Center-left varies depending on the indicator used. Participation of the Socialists in the cabinet dates from December 1963. The PSI had moved toward its new role, by abstaining in the vote of confidence, as early as August 1960.

6 I believe that the statement reflects quite well the overall quality of the relationship between the two parties for most of the period. Such a generalization obviously does not reflect accurately either the recent changes in posture nor the nuances of the positions taken by different party officials in different parts of the country. The ambivalent position of the PCI toward the DC is well described by Blackmer, Donald L. M. in Unity and Diversity: Italian Communism and the Communist World (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1968).Google Scholar

7 I have borrowed the distinction between visible and invisible politics from Sartori, Giovanni. ‘Rivisitando il “Pluralismo polarizzato”’ in Cavazza, Fabio Luca and Graubard, Stephen, eds., Il caso Italiano (Milano: Garzanti Editore, 1974), pp. 196–223.Google Scholar

8 See for example Cazzola, Franco, ‘Consenso e Opposizione nel Parlamento Italiano: il ruolo del PCI dalla I alla IV legislatura’ in Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, 11 (1972), 71–96Google Scholar, and Tamburrano, Giuseppe, ‘II dialogo tra DC, PCI e sinistra laica’, Il Mulino, XVII (1968), 599–609.Google Scholar

9 On the concept of multi-polarity, see Sartori. ‘Case of Polarized Pluralism’.

10 The survey was conducted in the early summer of 1972 by Samuel H. Barnes of the University of Michigan and the author. A stratified random sample of Italian voters (n = 1,841) were interviewed by the staff of Fieldwork of Milan supervised by Dr Angela Amoroso.

11 Barnes, Samuel H., ‘Modelli spaziali e l'identificazione partitica dell'elettore italiano’, Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, 1 (1971), 123–43Google Scholar; Sani, Giacomo, ‘A Test of the Least Distance Model of Voting Choice: Italy, 1972’, Comparative Political Studies, VII (1974), 193–208.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

12 This affective component is often present in the answers to an open-ended question on the differences between ‘left’ and ‘right’ asked in the 1972 survey.

13 Negative party preference could be defined as strong hostility on the part of a voter toward certain parties. From the point of view of charting the cleavages existing in a given system this information is a useful complement to knowledge of the voter's party preference.

14 Sani, Giacomo, ‘La strategia del PCI e l'elettorato Italiano’, Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, 111 (1973), 551–79, P. 568.Google Scholar

15 Sani, , ‘Strategia del PCI’, p. 570.Google Scholar

16 The charges against the MSI are often articulated with a passionate rejection of the fascist experience. An introductory text on Italian politics reflects well this position when it describes the MSI as: ‘the former Fascist little shots, who for lack of sufficient political acumen or for other causes, remained to the bitter end in the Fascist fold. Fortunately for Italian democracy, this group is remarkably sterile and disgusting to most Italians. Its main strength is in Rome, and it hardly exists in the north. In Rome, and on occasion in a few other cities, bands of neo-fascists have proved themselves adept at throwing stink-bombs and at clubbing their unarmed opponents.’ Adams, John Clarke and Barile, Paolo, The Government of Republican Italy, 3rd edn. (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), p. 163.Google Scholar

17 On the discussion about the democratic nature of the PCI and the party's evolution, see Sartori, Giovanni, ‘Tipologia dei sistemi di partito’, Quaderni di Sociologia, XVII (1968)Google Scholar, and ‘Rivisitando il “Pluralismo polarizzato”’; Tarrow, Sidney, Peasant Communism in Southern Italy (New Haven. Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967)Google Scholar; Fisichella, Domenico, ‘L'alternativa rischiosa: Considerazioni sul “Difficile governo”’, Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, 11 (1972), 589–614Google Scholar; Linz, Juan, ‘La democrazia Italians di fronte al future’Google Scholar in Cavazza, and Graubard, , eds., Il caso Italiano, 124–61.Google Scholar

18 On the nature and the themes of the 1948 campaign, see Mammarella, , L'Italia dopo il fascismo. Chap. 6, pp. 181–9.Google Scholar The importance of the realignment of 1947–48 is stressed by Lombardo, Antonio, ‘Dibattito sulla Grande Coalizione’, Il Mulino, xx (1971), 733–40, p. 735.Google Scholar

19 An excellent analysis of electoral propaganda themes in the 1953 and 1958 campaigns is contained in the volume edited by Facchi, Paolo, La propaganda politica in Italia (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1960).Google Scholar Useful information is to be found in the monograph by Barbano, Filippo, Partiti e pubblica opinione nella campagna elettorale (Torino: Edizioni Giappichelli, 1961)Google Scholar; see also Spreafico, Alberto ‘I programmi’Google Scholar, Visentini, Luciano, ‘Osservazioni sulla propaganda elettorale’Google Scholar and Weiss, Ignazio. ‘La stampa quotidiana’Google Scholar, Chaps, IV, V and VI of Spreafico, Alberto and LaPalombara, Joseph, eds., Elezioni e comportamento politico in Italia (Milano: Comunita', 1963), 211–327.Google Scholar

20 The number of MSI deputies increased from six in 1948 to twenty-nine in 1953. The party also elected nine senators.

21 The MSI offered to support the Zoli cabinet in 1958 and the Tambroni government in 1960 without asking for any commitments in matters of policy: Mammarella, , L'Italia dopo il fascismo, p. 323.Google Scholar

22 On the different phases of the process of re-legitimation of the PSI see Mammarella, , L'Italia dopo il fascismo, pp. 279–92, 311–16, 331–3.Google Scholar

23 Twenty-five deputies and twelve senators belonging to the left wing of the party refused to accept the entry of the PSI into the government and formed a new party, PSIUP, in 01 1964.Google Scholar

24 All parties but the PLI voted in favor of the bill. The debate was brief and its approval by both houses extremely quick.

25 On the efforts and successes of the PCI in developing organizational ties with different segments of society, see Manoukian, Agopik, ed., La presenza sociale del PCI e delta DC (Bologna: II Mulino. 1968).Google Scholar

26 The role of anti-Communism in maintaining the unity of the DC has been stressed by several observers. According to Giuseppe Tamburrano, a well-known DC leader, Paolo Emilio Taviani, admitted the unity of the DC would last as long as there was a Communist threat: ‘Dibattito sulla Grande Coalizione’, p. 712.Google Scholar

27 On this point, the different interpretations of the Italian party system by Giovanni Sartori and Giorgio Galli seem to converge. For the debate between Galli and Sartori see: Galli, Giorgio, Il bipartitismo imperfetto (Bologna: II Mulino, 1966)Google Scholar, and Il difficile governo (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1972)Google Scholar; Sartori, Giovanni, ‘Bipartitismo imperfetto o pluralismo polarizzato?’ Tempi Modemi, XXXI (1967), 1–34Google Scholar; and ‘Rivisitando il “Pluralismo polarizzato’”

28 The MSI offer was rejected at the official level by DC leaders. It proved very embarrassing nevertheless since DC and MSI were the only parties to campaign against the maintenance of the divorce legislation, and thus were, at least temporarily, in the same camp. Some aspects of the opposition tactics can be understood best in terms of the inability of political actors to play the opposition role correctly. According to Pasquino this is an enduring characteristic of Italian politics: Pasquino, Gianfranco, ‘II sistema politico Italiano tra neo-trasformismo e democrazia consociativa’ in Cavalli, Luciano, ed., Materiali sull'Italia in trasformazione (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1973).Google Scholar

29 The new stance of the PCI became apparent in July 1973 when Berlinguer announced that the party's opposition to the government led by Rumor, Mariano would be ‘of a different kind’.Google Scholar

30 The group Ordine Nuovo was founded in 1956 by Pino Rauti and other members of the MSI who left the party and accused the then party secretary Michelini of pursuing a too moderate course.

31 On the relationship between the small radical groups and the PCI, see Galli, Giorgio, ‘Il PCI rivisitato’, Il Mulino, XX (1971), 25–52.Google Scholar

32 On the course of the PCI in recent years see Blackmer, Donald L. M., ‘Italian Communism: Strategy for the 1970s’, in Problems of Communism, XXI (1972), 41–56Google Scholar; and also Galli, , ‘Il PCI rivisitato’.Google Scholar

33 For example, several radical groups of the left use a hammer and sickle symbol similar to that of the PCI.

34 The efforts to minimize the party's responsibility for political violence are particularly difficult in view of the many personal and ideological connections between the MSI and the radical groups of the right.

35 Not much is known about the composition, aims and strategy of the Red Brigades, a far-left, anti-parliamentary group formed in 1972, that has claimed as its own a number of kidnappings. See Panorama, 30 05 1974.Google Scholar

38 These moves by the Soviet Union often oblige the PCI to carry out a ‘war on two fronts’, i.e. to show its cautious dissent and disapproval of Soviet actions without damaging the image of the USSR in the eyes of its militants. See Galli, , ‘Il PCI rivisitato’.Google Scholar

37 These and similar events have provided precious ammunition to the other parties and have been widely exploited to embarrass PCI and MSI.

38 It is well known that in Italy elections for local offices are often transformed into contests with little reference to local issues and candidates. The results of these elections are often regarded by political elites as tests of the parties' strength and of the changing moods of the electorate.

39 In particular the lack of comparable data for earlier points in time makes it difficult to assess whether and to what extent mass orientations have changed in recent times.

40 The text of the question was: ‘In your opinion are parties of the extreme right (or extreme left) a danger for democracy in Italy?’ The distributions of answers for the sample as a whole were: (a) Extreme right: yes, 41·7; no, 21·3; no opinion, 33·9; N.A., 3·1. (b) Extreme left: yes, 38–2; no, 25–0, no opinion, 33–6; N.A. 3·2.

41 The distribution obtained by disregarding the D.K. and N.A. answers is the following: per cent agreeing with the statement that the extreme left is a threat to democracy: PCI, 364Google Scholar; PSI, 476Google Scholar; PSDI, 68·5; PRI, 72·4; DC, 78·5; PLI, 96·0; MSI, 77·1. Per cent agreeing with the statement that the extreme right is a threat to democracy: PCI, 78·6; PSI, 79·9; PSDI, 83·6; PRI, 84·0; DC. 62·3; PLI, 45·9; MSI, 17·5.

42 Answers to open-ended questions on the most important differences between the left and the right often make reference to the ‘totalitarian’ nature of one or both.

43 The best example is the bombing of the Banca dell'Agricoltura in Milan, in 1969.Google Scholar At first the blame for this act of terrorism was placed on the anarchist Valpreda. At a later stage two members of the radical right, Freda and Ventura, were indicted for the crime.

44 A variety of episodes, many of which remain obscure, has been cited as evidence for the existence of a black conspiracy (‘trame nere’). See Panorama, 6, 13, 27 06, 25 07, 15 08 1974.Google Scholar

45 A report to parliament made on 13 August 1974 by the Minister of the Interior indicated that the major acts of terrorism fell upon groups such as Ordine Nuovo, Ordine Nero, Avanguardia Nazionale, Lotta di Popolo, Anno Zero, which were all composed of right-wing extremists.

46 The ‘neo-fascists’ were indicated as involved in violence by 56·9 per cent of all respondents. The figure is 94·0 per cent when we exclude the ‘no opinion, no answer’ category. For the ‘maoists’ the figures are 52·0 and 85·5 respectively.

47 Again the juxtaposition becomes more evident when we look at the respondents who had a definite opinion on the matter.

48 The values of the gamma coefficient of association among these items are reported in Table 12.

49 Although all centrist parties, and recently also the PSI, have had some say in the management of RAI the control of this important channel of political communication has been in the hands of Christian Democrats (especially those of the Fanfani faction).

50 On the press and its political leanings see Weiss, Ignazio, Politico dell'informazione (Milano: Comunita', 1961)Google Scholar; Capecchi, Vittorio and Livolsi, Marino, La stampa quotidiana in Italia (Milano: Bompiani, 1971)Google Scholar; Murialdi, Paolo, La stampa Italiana nel dopoguerra: 1943–1972 (Bari: Laterza, 1973).Google Scholar

51 Sani, Giacomo, ‘Le immagini dei partiti’ in Caciagli, Mario and Spreafico, Alberto, eds., Un sistema politico alla prova (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1975).Google Scholar

52 Sani, Giacomo, ‘Canali di informazione e atteggiamenti politici’, Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, iv (1974), 371–86.Google Scholar

53 I have developed this argument in ‘Mass Level Response to Party Strategy: the Italian Electorate and the Communist Party’ in Blackmer, Donald L. M. and Tarrow, Sidney, eds., Communism in Italy and France (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975).Google Scholar

54 The influence of these subcultures in shaping the general orientations of party militants is described in Alberoni, Francesco, ed., L'attivista di partito (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1967).Google Scholar It seems likely that the same mechanisms operate also for the less politicized segments of the population.

55 See especially the volume edited by Cavazza, and Graubard, , Il caso ItalianoGoogle Scholar, and the debate on the grand coalition with the participation of scholars and observers of different political persuasions, Il Mulino, XX (1971)Google Scholar, issues 213, 214, 215, 216 and 218.

56 The institutional reforms suggested have included: changes in the electoral system, reform of parliament, measures designed to reduce the influence of factions within the parties, lowering of the voting age, restructuring of the state-owned radio and television corporation. A variety of points of view on the desirability of alternative coalition realignment is to be found in the collection of short essays and position papers by politicians, union leaders, political scientists and journalists published in Biblioteca della Liberia, XI (1974).Google Scholar

57 Galli, , especially in Il bipartitismo imperfettoGoogle Scholar and in Il difficile governo.

58 In giving the composition of the ‘coalition of the left’ in terms of parties I may have slightly misrepresented Galli's proposal. Galli refers explicitly only to the PCI and to the PSI and adds to these two forces: ‘un settore sufficientemente forte della borghesia produttiva organizzata e un settore di ispirazione cattolica del movimento operaio’, Il difficile governo, p. 260.Google Scholar

59 For an interesting discussion of the price that DC and PCI, as well as other parties, would have to pay to favor this re-structuring of the party system, see Tamburrano, , ‘Dibattito sulla Grande Coalizione’, especially pp. 715–18.Google Scholar

60 This is in part the argument made by Sartori in his ‘Rivisitando il “Pluralismopolarizzato”’.

61 The different labels used include: ‘grande coalizione’, ‘blocco storico’, ‘repubblica conciliare’, ‘grande connubio’.

62 On the continuity of the PCI strategy see Blackmer, , Unity in DiversityGoogle Scholar, and ‘Italian Communism: Strategy for the 1970s’.

63 The ratification of the ‘historic compromise’ proposal by the Central Committee of the PCI in the fall of 1973 represents a victory for the Berlinguer line over the alternative course proposed by Amendola, a participation of the PCI in a coalition of the left.

64 Berlinguer, 's proposal appeared in Rinascita, 11 10 1973.Google Scholar For some reactions to the proposal see Panorama, 25 10 1973 and 8 11 1973.Google Scholar

65 According to reports of the press this appeared to be the position of a number of DC leaders during the July meeting of the National Council of the Christian Democratic party. A more negative position on the relationship between the DC and the PCI has been expressed recently by the secretary of the Christian Democratic party; see his article in Il Popolo, 22 08 1974.Google Scholar

66 The results of a public opinion survey conducted toward the end of 1974 by and large confirm the findings reported earlier. According to a poll carried out by Demoskopea of Milan, the orientations of the voters of the three largest parties toward the ‘historic compromise’ was as follows (per cent of each party's supporters): PCI, 60·2 favorable, 18·9 uncertain, 20·9 unfavorable; DC, 25·1 favorable, 33·1 uncertain, 418 unfavorable; PSI, 51·1 favorable, 242 uncertain, 24·7 unfavorable. The figures were published in Corriere della Sera, 8 12 1974, p. 8.Google Scholar

67 Limited agreements between the DC and PCI on local problems in the cities of Venice, Avellino, Agrigento and Cosenza reported in the press at the end of 1974 appear to be developments in this direction.

68 Galli, , Il difficile governo, p. 261.Google Scholar