Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 January 2009
All the theories of coalition formation known to us incorporate an assumption (or a set of assumptions which imply) that coalitions which are formed must at least be ‘winning’. 1 In the present context, a coalition is said to be winning if the sum of the seats held by its members is at least a simple majority of all the seats in the parliament. Most of these theories were intended to apply to government coalitions: indeed, several of them were specifically designed for this situation. Yet out of the total of 207 governments which have formed in twelve western democracies since the war, 2 seventy-four of them have not been winning.
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2 The universe of western parliamentary democracies includes Britain, West Germany, New Zealand, Australia and Luxembourg. As none of these countries experienced minority government in the post-war years they are excluded from the analysis.
3 Hurwitz, Leon, ‘An Index of Democratic Political Stability: a Methodological Note’, Comparative Political Studies, IV (1971), 41–68, p. 44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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5 No minority government has come to power in the countries we examine later in which one party has had a simple majority of the seats in the lower house of the legislature.
6 Our data are from Keesing's Contemporary Archives.
7 House of Commons, 16 December 1852.
8 Chubb, Basil, The Government and Politics of Ireland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 163–4.Google Scholar
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10 Macrae, Duncan, Parliaments, Parties and Society in France (New York: St. Martin's Press 1967), p. 59.Google Scholar
11 Keesing's, pp. 16,601, 16,895, 17,090, 17,125.
12 Keesing's, p. 19,657. See also Groennings, Sven, ‘Patterns, Strategies, and Pay-offs in Norwegian Coalition Formation’, in Groennings, Kelley, and Leiserson, , eds., The Study of Coalition Behaviour, pp. 60–79.Google Scholar
13 Blondel, Jean, ‘Party Systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, I (1968), 180–203.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
14 Keesing's, p. 17,786.
15 Keesing's, pp. 23,911, 23,964.
16 Keesing's, pp. 23,205, 23,941, 24,925.
17 When opening the Parliament, President Kekkonen said: ‘After the people who were called to the polls had cast their votes, which is necessary in a democracy, the situation, as far as the forming of a government is concerned was difficult and confused. Even though we had difficulties in making governments in the past, too, it will be no exaggeration to say that now especially it will be difficult to find useful alternatives’. Report in Sankiaho, Risto and Laaks, Seppo, ‘Results of the Parliamentary Elections and the Formation of the Cabinets of Teuvo Aura and Ahti Karjalainen in 1970’, Scandinavian Political Studies, VI (1971), 212–15, p. 213.Google Scholar
18 Keesing's, pp. 23,929, 24,000, 24,111. Also see Sankiaho and Laaks, ‘Results of the Parliamentary Elections’. Klaus Tornudd writes: ‘The total time during which Finland has had a Cabinet with majority backing in Parliament between April 1919 and March 1966 has been a little more than 24 years… On average… Cabinets with majority backing in Parliament have been almost equally stable – or unstable.’ The Electoral System of Finland (London: Evelyn, 1968), pp. 130.Google Scholar Also see Tornudd, Klaus, ‘Composition of Cabinets in Finland 1917–68’, Scandinavian Political Studies, IV (1969), 58–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar A discussion of the role of the Finnish President can be found in Kastori, Paavo, ‘The Position of the President in the Finnish Political System’, Scandinavian Political Studies, IV (1969), 151–9.Google Scholar
19 Keesing's, pp. 21,749, 21,893.
20 Keesing's, pp. 19,291, 19,250, 19,372.
21 Earlier, a leading Radical politician, Hilmar Baungaard, had stated: ‘Co-operation is a simple necessity under a minority government, and as no party alone is likely to command a majority in the foreseeable future, it is no overstatement that co-operation among the parties is the foundation on which Danish Parliamentary Government and Danish Politics must in general build their existence. This will be the attitude of the Radikale Venstre, irrespective of what government we have. Surely it will cost us varying degrees of effort to co-operate, but we will do so.’ Reported in Pedersen, Mogens N., ‘Consensus and Conflict in the Danish Folketing, 1945–65’, Scandinavian Political Studies, II (1967), 143–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
22 Keesing's, pp. 21,816, 22,793. Also see Sorensen, Curt and Glans, Ingemar, ‘Denmark: Politics since 1964 and the Parliamentary Election of 1966’, Scandinavian Political Studies, II (1967). pp. 263–72.Google Scholar
23 Keesing's, pp. 19,285, 19,413. Following a subsequent general election a minority Liberal administration took over office. In a post-election statement, the Prime Minister, Lester Pearson, said: ‘My government is just short of a clear majority. I do not complain about that. It is my resolve not to allow the lack of such a clear majority to influence the government in any way that will weaken its action…. We will not be seeking any special deals. We will break no trust, barter no principles. The task ahead is immense, but it is not frightening. It is complex, beyond simple description, but it is not impossible.’
24 Keesing's, p. 14,023.
25 Keesing's, p. 21,704.
26 Keesing's, p. 11,780.
27 Keesing's, pp. 15,573, 15,876, 16,174, 16,234, 16,394.
28 De Swaan, , ‘An Empirical Model’, p. 428.Google Scholar