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Some Recent Work in Public Choice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2009

Iain McLean
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Extract

The standing of the public choice approach to politics is ambiguous. Most people now accept that there is something in it, even if the ‘something’ is restricted to Arrow's Social Choice and Individual Values, Downs's An Economic Theory of Democracy, Olson's The Logic of Collective Action, and (perhaps) Riker's The Theory of Political Coalitions. The Logic, for instance, is a cult abbreviation propagated by Olson himself but accepted by others. Three new adjectives (Downsian, Arrovian and Olsonian) are now established, although I have not yet found ‘Rikerian’. By analogy (Keynesian, The General Theory), the language seems to denote acceptance. But the seminal works (they are always seminal, as dawn in the Odyssey is always rosy-fingered) came out between 1951 and 1965; so where are their successors? Why have they had relatively little impact on student texts and informed public opinion? In short, what has been going on?

A very great deal, in fact. The first generation proposed bold hypotheses; their successors have put enormous efforts into refining them and proposing new ones, and (unfortunately) rather limited efforts into testing them. There have been four main lines of development. It would be impossible to review all four critically in a single article; therefore I make only fairly brief comments on the first three and devote most of this article to the fourth, which I think is one of the most promising and of the greatest interest to political scientists.

Type
Review Article
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 16 , Issue 3 , July 1986 , pp. 377 - 394
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1986

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References

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11 Respectively published by University of Chicago Press, 1978 and University of California Press, 1979.

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