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Strategic Behavior and Organizational Structure in Religions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 June 2013

Donald Wittman
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Abstract

Religions are organized in a variety of ways. They may resemble an elected autocracy, a parliamentary democracy or something akin to a monarchy, in which heredity plays a primary role. These differing power arrangements call for different types of strategic behavior in the fight for control of church doctrine and finances. They also induce different institutional responses. This article explains cases in which screening is highly institutionalized and when a person's age may be an important strategic factor in choosing a leader. It thus explains what otherwise would be very puzzling differences in the age of appointment across religions and within a particular religion, over time. The study also applies the methodology to politics more generally by looking at elections in Venice and Genoa in the eighteenth century and the appointment of leaders in present-day China.

Type
Articles
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 44 , Issue 4 , October 2014 , pp. 717 - 739
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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Footnotes

*

Economics Department, University of California, Santa Cruz (email: wittman@ucsc.edu). I would like to thank Doug Allen, the referees and editor for very helpful comments. Data replication sets are available at http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1017/S0007123413000161 and online appendices are available at http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1017/S0007123413000161.

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Supplementary material: PDF

Wittman Supplementary Material

Appendix

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