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Technology Competition and International Co-operation: Friends or Foes?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 February 2013

Sung Eun Kim  and
Johannes Urpelainen
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Abstract

Is technology competition between commercial rivals an impediment to international co-operation? Or could it instead help states collaborate? Our game-theoretic model suggests that technology competition impedes international co-operation when states hold ‘techno-nationalist’ preferences but have starkly asymmetric abilities to capture new markets. States that expect to lose refuse to co-operate, so treaty formation fails. However, technology competition may also facilitate co-operation. While states invest in new technologies out of self-interest, doing so also reduces consumer prices for other states. Comparative case studies of environmental co-operation demonstrate the model's utility. For example, European co-operation on climate policy was easier to achieve because forerunner countries, such as Denmark and Germany, implemented industrial policies that enhanced the competitiveness of their renewable energy industries. This technology competition reduced the cost of renewable energy for other European countries, and thus lowered the economic costs of their emissions reductions.

Type
Articles
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 44 , Issue 3 , July 2014 , pp. 545 - 574
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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Footnotes

*

Department of Political Science, Columbia University (email: ju2178@columbia.edu). We thank Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, the anonymous reviewers, Christopher Marcoux, Michaël Aklin and Tom Hale for useful comments on previous drafts. Data replication sets are available at http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1017/S0007123412000762.

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