Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-7cvxr Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T05:20:39.602Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Gödel's Conceptual Realism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 January 2014

Donald A. Martin*
Affiliation:
Department of Mathematics, University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USAE-mail: dam@math.ucla.edu

Extract

Kurt Gödel is almost as famous—one might say “notorious”—for his extreme platonist views as he is famous for his mathematical theorems. Moreover his platonism is not a myth; it is well-documented in his writings. Here are two platonist declarations about set theory, the first from his paper about Bertrand Russell and the second from the revised version of his paper on the Continuum Hypotheses.

      Classes and concepts may, however, also be conceived as real objects, namely classes as “pluralities of things” or as structures consisting of a plurality of things and concepts as the properties and relations of things existing independently of our definitions and constructions.
      It seems to me that the assumption of such objects is quite as legitimate as the assumption of physical bodies and there is quite as much reason to believe in their existence.
      But, despite their remoteness from sense experience, we do have something like a perception also of the objects of set theory, as is seen from the fact that the axioms force themselves upon us as being true. I don't see any reason why we should have less confidence in this kind of perception, i.e., in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception.

The first statement is a platonist declaration of a fairly standard sort concerning set theory. What is unusual in it is the inclusion of concepts among the objects of mathematics. This I will explain below. The second statement expresses what looks like a rather wild thesis.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2005

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

[1] Benacerraf, Paul and Putnam, Hilary (editors), Philosophy of mathematics, selected readings, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964.Google Scholar
[2] Feferman, Solomon, Dawson, John W. Jr., Kleene, Stephen C., Moore, Gregory H., Solovay, Robert M., and van Heijenoort, Jean (editors), Kurt Gödel: Collected works, vol. 2, Oxford University Press, New York, 1990.Google Scholar
[3] Feferman, Solomon, Dawson, John W. Jr., Goldfarb, Warren, Parsons, Charles, and Solovay, Robert M. (editors), Kurt Gödel: Collected works, vol. 3, Oxford University Press, New York, 1995.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[4] Gödel, Kurt, Russell's mathematical logic, In Feferman, et al. [2], Reprinted from [10], 123–153, pp. 119141.Google Scholar
[5] Gödel, Kurt, What is Cantor's Continuum Problem?, In Feferman, et al. [2], Reprinted from American Mathematical Monthly, vol. 54 (1947), 515525, pp. 176–187.Google Scholar
[6] Gödel, Kurt, What is Cantor's Continuum Problem?, In Feferman, et al. [2], Reprinted from [1], 258–273, which is a revised and expanded version of [5], pp. 254270.Google Scholar
[7] Gödel, Kurt, Some basic theorems on the foundations of mathematics and their implications, In Feferman, et al. [3], Unpublished text of Josiah Willard Gibbs Lecture, given at Brown University in 12, 1951, pp. 304323.Google Scholar
[8] Martin, Dönald A., Multiple universes of sets and indeterminate truth values, Topoi, vol. 20 (2001), pp. 516.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[9] Parsons, Charles, Platonism and mathematical intuition in Kurt Gödel's thought, this Bulletin, vol. 1 (1995), pp. 4474.Google Scholar
[10] Schilpp, Paul L. (editor), The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, Library of Living Philosophers, vol. 5, Northwestern University, Evanston, 1944.Google Scholar