which corresponds to R, 179, 11. 14–15: 
… 
. That it is not always India that has the shorter version can be seen from the following example. India, Hyd., 20, 1. 9, reads 
which corresponds to R, 173, 12: 
.
), which refer to the aṣṭāṅgāni ‘eight limbs, or stages’ in Yogasūtra, ch. 2, sūtra 29 et seq. (see R. 182–3).
here cf. the term manda ‘slow-moving, tardy, sluggish’ in Nāgeśa's commentary on sūtra 2.1: yogādhikāriṇas trividhā manda-madhyamottamāḥ krameṇāru-rukṣu-yuñjāna-yogārūḍha-rūpāḥ ‘Those appropriately engaged in yoga are of three kinds: the tardy, the middling, and the most excellent, namely the novice (or aspirant, lit: “the one who wishes to climb”), the practiser (lit: “the one applying himself”), and the adept (lit: “the one who has mounted on”, i.e. is in control of yoga) in successive stages’. Also cf. Baladeva ad loc.
has been adopted. The MS has 
and not 
as Ritter's text has it.
The term occurs in a similar context in India, Hyd., 21; tr. 
(Sachau (tr.), I, 80).
‘steadfast performance of acts of worship’: cf. kriyā-yoga in the sūtra. Al-Bīrūnī appears to consider kriyā-yoga as co-ordinate with the rest of the sūtra. Unlike all other translators, al-Bīrūnī correctly understood here kriyā to mean ‘ritual act’ and not ‘activity’ in general. Cf. the use of the same term in sūtra 2.36 below: … kriyā-phala … ‘the fruits of ritual acts …’ (cf. Manusmṛti 6.82; Bhagavadgītā 2.43; 11.48; Jaimini's Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.2.1; and elsewhere). Also cf. Bhagavadgītā 6.1: … kāryaṃ karma karoti yaḥ … na niragnir na cākriyaḥ ‘… he who does action that is required (by religion) … not he who builds no sacred fires and does no ritual acts’; and cf. 
‘tiring the body’: cf. tapaḥ in the sūtra, and its gloss as śarīra-śoṣaṇaṃ kāya-śoṣaḥ ‘emaciating (or drying up) of the body’ (e.g. Baladeva, Rāmānanda ad loc., of. Yājñavalkya's pronouncement quoted in Madhava's Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha, ch. on the Pātañjala-darśana: … śarīra-śoṣaṇaṃ prāhus tapasāṃ tapa uttamam 
and 
(
‘prayer, chants of praise and recitations’: cf. svādhyāya in the sūtra and Vy. ad loc.: svādhyāyaḥ praṇavādi-pavitrāṇāṃ jopo mokṣa-śāstrādhyayanaṃ vā ‘The term svādhyāya stands either for repeated utterance of such purifying formulae as the syllable oṃ, or for the study of doctrinal texts on liberation’. (Cf. Śaṅkara on Chāndogyopaniṣad 1.12.1). Gangānātha Jhā's translation of the term svādhyāya by ‘self-teaching’ (
: cf. īśvara-praṇidhāna in the sūtra. Also cf. the expression īśvarābhimukhīkaraṇa ‘directing oneself to the īśvara’ in a definition of the Sanskrit term referred to by Baladeva's com. on the sūtra. (See, however, al-Bīrūni's rendering of the term in sūtra 2.45 below: n. 152.) The term īśvara-praṇidhāna has frequently been restrictively rendered by translators of the Yogasūtra. Thus ‘resignation to the Lord’ (
and 
(R, 173); and in translating the term in sūtra 2.1 he quite similarly uses the words 
and 
(R, 177). Al-Bīrūnī's translation of sūtra 2.1 implies (a) an understanding of this sūtra as referring back to sūtra 1.23; and (b) an understanding of tapas, svādhyāya, and īśvara-praṇidhāna as being closely interconnected in one well-integrated process. These two points are similar to the explanation propounded by H. Jacobi. The latter points out (a) that the pair of expressions svādhyāya and īśvara-praṇidhāna of sūtra 2.1 corresponds to the pair of expressions taj-japa (‘repeated utterance of the symbolic syllable oṃ’) and tad-artha-bhāvana (contemplation on the meaning of that syllable, i.e. on the īśvara) of sūtra 1.28 respectively. Jacobi shows (b) a further correspondence in that īśvara-praṇidhāna follows svādhyāya (cf. also sūtra 2.32) in the same manner as tad-artha-bhāvana follows taj-japa (
which is m the MS has been adopted instead of 
which occurs in Ritter's printed text.
in the Arabic text corresponds to kleśa tanūkarana, 
—kleśāh (cf. 
… 
. However, al-Bīrūnī seems to have rendered the term below in sūtra 2 45, R, p. 183, 1. 8, by 
samādhi can mean ‘adjustment, settling, fixing’, as well as ‘reconciling’ (cf samdhi ‘union, reconciliation’) And see n. 152 below.
‘weights, burdens’.
‘opinion’ does not prima facie accord with asmitā ‘egoism, ego awareness’ (cf below Ans. to Q 27) Vy. and Vāc ad loc describe all the five kleśas as viparyayas ‘modes of erroneous knowledge’ (cf. YS 1 6, 8 with Vy ad loc; 
as one of the kleśas. (In rendering viparyaya in sūtras 1.6, 8 above, R, 171, however, he used the Arabic word 
, and for vikalpa—
whereas the reverse, i e. the use of the latter Arabic term for the former Sanskrit term and of the former Arabic term for the latter Sanskrit term, would have seemed more appropriate.)
‘as a frog stunned (or crushed) by a blow (or by beating)’: the Sanskrit word maṇḍūka commonly means ‘frog’; the word cūrṇa can mean ‘pulverized, pounded’. However, the mistaking of maṇḍūka as referring to a frog rather than to the plant bearing this name seems to have occurred already in Vāc. under YS 1.19 in an amplified version of the simile in question. The latter reads: yathā varṣātipāte mṛd-bhāvam upagato maṇḍūka-dehaḥ punar ambhoda-vāridhārāvasekān maṇḍūka-deha-bhāvam anubhavatīti ‘Just as in the absence of rains a frog's body, after having been reduced to a state of earth, when sprinkled with water from a cloud experiences again the state of being a frog's body’. This misunderstanding in Vāc. of maṇḍūka as ‘frog’ may have been encouraged by the observable connexion of the revivification of frogs with the advent of the rainy season, as expressed in the well-known ‘frog-hymn’, Ṛgveda 7.103.1–2: saṃvatsaráṃ śaśayān 
brāhmaṇ 
kā avādiṣuḥ // divy 
tiṃ, ná śúṣkaṃ saras 
śáyānam / gávām áha ná mãyúr vatsínīnām maṇḍ 
to stun by a blow’ in the Arabic text here. It is also conceivable, however, that the latter Arabic expression is due to al-Bīrūnī's having misunderstood the expression atipāte to mean ‘attacking, knocking out’. Such a meaning for this word seems to be attested through the expression prāṇātipāta (Rāmāyaṇa 1.58.22, crit. ed. G. H. Bhatt, Baroda, 1960). A similar misunderstanding —either by al-Bīrūnī or by the commentary used by him—of the word maṇḍūka as referring to a frog rather than to the plant bearing that name may underly the similar simile occurring in the Arabic text below in Ans. to Q 27 = R, p. 179,1. 6 
‘they (the enfeebled afflictions) become like unto roasted seeds which (cannot) be made to germinate through being sown in the ground, and like unto stewed frogs which cannot be revived through being plunged into a water tank’. Also cf. Mahābhārata 12.204.16 (Poona ed.), for the simile of the ‘burnt seeds’.
instead of 
of Ritter's text.
‘one of those two’, i.e. one of a pair of afflictions. See following note.
—the plural form.
‘They call the soul puruṣa’; 
and avidyā, 
and 
—aśuci and śuci, 
and 
—duḥkha and sukha. The error referred to in the Arabic text, that the body is pre-eternal—or eternal—is to some extent paralleled by Vāc. on sūtra 2.5, where reference is made to the practice of drinking soma in order to become deathless. The misapprehension of the body as man himself, referred to in the Arabic text, derives presumably from a passage similar to Vy. on sūtra 2.5: tathānātmany ātma-khyātir bāhyopakaranesu cetanācetaneṣu bhogādhiṣṭhāne vā śarīre puruṣopakaraṇe vā manasy anātmany ātmakhyātir iti ‘Similarly, apprehension of self in what is not self: “apprehension of self in what is not the self is apprehension of self in what is an animate or inanimate extraneous auxiliary, viz. the body, which is rather the location of sense-experience, or the mind, which is rather a tool of the puruṣa”’. And cf. Sadāśivendra Sarasvatī on sūtra 2.5. Apparently al-Bīrūnī rendered puruṣa according to its original meaning ‘man’. It may be added that the distinction between the body and ‘man’ was a commonplace of dominant trends of Greek and Arabic philosophy (cf. 
reflect a Greek philosophical conception. See, however, the sixteenth-century 
a parallel passage in India, Hyd., 52 has 
(Sachau (tr.), 1, 68: ‘… and perceives that that which it held to be good and delightful is in reality bad and painful’). This version seems to approximate more closely than that of the Istanbul MS, which may be corrupt, to the meaning of sūtra 2.5.
derives from the same root as 
which is rendered here by ‘confusion’.
, in spite of the difference of terminology, corresponds to s¯tra 2.6: dṛg-darśana-śaktyor ekātmatevāsmitā ‘Egoism is the state in which the faculty constituted by the seeing(-agent, i.e. puruṣa) and the faculty constituted by the sightf(-instrument, i.e. citta) appear as being essentially one (i.e. identical)’. (Deussen's version reads here eva instead of iva. The latter variant is, however, more plausible. It is supported by the semantically and syntactically similar use of iva in sūtra 2.54. For śakti here, cf. sūtra 2.23). But al-Bīrūnī has 
, which he uses to render vikalpa (R, p. 171,1. 8) and perhaps viparyaya (R, p. 178, 1. 1), whereas the sūtra here has asmitā ‘egoism, ego-awareness, feeling of personality’, the concept of which implies but is not identical with ‘wrong opinion’. Cf. 
‘the light of the eye’ cf. cakṣuḥprakāśa in YS 3.21. For the underlying concept see Nārāyaṇa's Mānameyodaya 2.2 (ed. C. Kunhan Raja and S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, Adyar, Madras, 1933, 9): cakṣur nāma kanīnikāntara-gataṃ tejo … ‘What is known as the sense of sight consists of the light situated inside the pupil of the eye’. And cf. for the varieties referred to in the Arabic text here op. cit., p. 155: tejas … arka-candrāgni-nakṣatra-suvarṇādi-rūpaṃ nayanendriya-rūpaṃ ca ‘Light (or: fire; German: Glut) is of two kinds: (a) that which has the form of the sun, the moon, (ordinary) fire, the stars, gold, etc., and (b) that of the form of the sense of sight’. Also cf. Gautama's Nyāyasūtra 1.1.12 and 3.1.30 (ed. W. Ruben, Leipzig, 1928); Annambhaṭṭa's Tarkasangraha ed. Y. V. Athalye, Bombay, 1930, 8, and notes ad loc. Also cf. 
may be an attempted transcription of āndhra, the name of a South Indian country, whose western border could have been conceived (in North India) as extending as far as the Western Ghāṭs (malayādri). For the likelihood of the association of Āndhra with sandalwood cf. Daṇḍin's Daśakumāracarita, seventh ucchvāsa, ed. Kāle, fourth ed., Delhi, 1966, 177. In India, however, the name āndhra seems to be transcribed as 
(
(Hyd., 135, Sachau (tr.), 1,173), and the derivative form 
(loc. cit.). Alternatively 
may be an attempt at transcribing candanādri ‘the Sandal mountain’, or ‘deriving from the Sandal mountain’, referring to the Western Ghāṭs in South India, known as the source of the best sandalwood, and frequently referred to in Sanskrit literature. A further possibility is to read here 
i.e. deriving from the dardura mountain (well-known for its sandalwood, cf. e.g. Kālidāsa's Raghuvaṃśa 4.51).
which is the form occurring in al-Bīrūni's 
‘… the power of digestion is so weak that they must strengthen it by eating the leaves of betel after dinner, and by chewing the betel-nut. The hot betel inflames the heat of the body …’ (Sachau (tr.), II, 152). Also cf. 
should apparently be vocalized: 
.
followed by 
. We propose to read 
may be interpreted in both ways.
of the Arabic text here.
. Cf. R, p. 178,1. 1.
, lit. ‘consequent upon’.
.
is viewed by al-Bīrūnī as a rendering of kleśa. Cf. above R, 177.
may also be rendered by ‘cause’ or ‘means’. This last rendering may be suggested by the reference to sūtra 2.11: dhyāna-heyās tad-vrttayaḥ ‘Their functions (i.e. their manifestations, or the afflictions in their gross and active phase) should be relinquished by meditation’.
Cf. 
R, p. 178. 
may correspond to sthūla ‘gross’ in Vy. on sūtra 2.11.
‘reward’, which occurs in the next sentence, and 
‘remuneration’.
and not 
which occurs in Ritter's printed text.
‘angels’ is the usual Arabic translation for ‘gods’ in polytheistic, for instance Greek, texts. Cf. 
.
; Ritter's printed text has 
We propose to read 
(or possibly 
.
.
.
.
.
(
which occur both in India and the translation of the YS can also be translated: ‘… and to well-being in adversity and prosperity’. Here 
seems to render bhoga ‘experience’ (lit. ‘enjoyment’).
. The relevant passage in India, referred to by R, has 
‘spirit’.
is less plausible than 
that occurs hi the MS.
and not 
which occurs in Rās text.
‘superior’. For the reading 
cf. vivekin ‘discriminative, wise’ in sūtra 2.15: pariṇāma-tāpa-saṃskāra-duḥkhair guṇa-vṛtti-virodhāc ca sarvaṃ duḥkham eva vivekinaṇ ‘To the discriminating person all is nothing but suffering, on account of (the types of) suffering constituted by (a) transmutation (of pleasure into eventual suffering e.g. through hankering for it), (b) pain as such (or the anxiety to secure pleasure), and (c) latent impressions (i.e. past demerit which results in suffering), and because the functions of the guṇas (which constitute the mind) are in conflict’. For the conflict between the three guṇas cf. 
which is given in Ritter's text as 
. The reading of this word is doubtful. An alternative reading could be 
i.e. ‘the alternating succession’ of good and evil.
. The correct reading is 
. Cf. India, Hyd. (see next note).
. seems preferable to 
. as vocalized in R. Cf. 
. This is translated by Sachau: ‘For he who accurately understands the affairs of the world knows that the good ones among them are evil in reality, and that the bliss which they afford changes in the course of recompense into pains. Therefore he avoids everything which might result in making him stay in the world for a stitt longer period’ (op. cit., 1, 79; italics— ours, T.G. and S.P.). Also cf. next note. In India al-Bīrūnī also uses the term 
. as a Ṣūfī term. Cf. 
‘Further they (i.e. the Ṣūfīs) say: “Between man and God there are a thousand stages of light and darkness”’ (
‘turn away’ in the Arabic text seems to correspond to heyam ‘is to be relinquished’ or ‘should be relinquished’.
‘that which generates entanglement and engenders (a specific) station (in existence)’ is probably a rendering of a gloss on duḥkha in terms of saṃsāra. The latter term has the meaning ‘undergoing transmigration’ (as well as ‘mundane existence, the world’). Cf. Bhoja on sūtra 2.16: … saṃsāra-duḥkhaṃ hātavyam ‘…mundane suffering is to be abandoned’; and on sūtra 2.17: sa heyasya duḥkhasya guṇa-pariṇāma-rūpasya saṃsārasya hetuḥ ‘That is the cause of the suffering which is to be relinquished, i.e. of the mundane condition (saṃsāra) which consists in the transformation of the constituent qualities’.
may refer to 
‘entanglement’ and 
‘station’, in which case the dual 
would be gramatically more correct. Alternatively, it may refer to 
in 
‘from that which’. In this case 
would be grammatically more correct.
roughly corresponds to draṣṭṛ in sūtra 2.17; 
to dṛśya 
to saṃyoga 
roughly corresponds to heyam 
in the singular. This Arabic term renders bhūta ‘element’, which occurs in Vy. on sūtra 2.18: … bhūta-bhāvena prthivy-ādinā …‘… as elements (it evolves into) earth …’ Cf. B, 191, 1. 4 (third chapter of the Arabic text): 
‘This is what he attains as far as the elements are concerned, i.e. earth, water, fire, wind, and heaven’. (Elsewhere al-Bīrūnī seems to render ākāśa by 
‘air’. Cf. R, 170, 190; see 
or 
may refer to guṇa (which is elsewhere sometimes rendered by 
, e.g. B, p. 191, 1. 7). Cf., however, Vy. on sūtra 2.18: tatreṣṭāniṣṭa-guṇa-svarūpāvadhāraṇam … ‘the determination of the nature of guṇas (viz. specific objects of experience) as being desirable or undesirable …’. See also following note.
. The words 
may be an attempt based on the commentary used by al-Bīrūnī to translate the rest of the sūtra. The possibility cannot be ruled out that al-Bīrūnī may have discovered the view that one of the three guṇas, namely kriyā (= rajas) is a compound of the other two in this commentary used by him. But if this too should not have been the case, the conjecture may be put forward that this passage may have been due to a misunderstanding on his part of a definition of bhoga ‘experience’ similar to that occurring in Vy. on sūtra 2.18: … isṭāniṣṭa-guṇa-svarūpāvadhāraṇam avibhāgāpannaṃ bhogo …‘… experience is the determination of the nature of the guṇas (viz. in the form of specific empirical objects), which have not been distinguished (from the real self, the puruṣa) as being desirable or undesirable’ (cf. definition of experience in sūtra 3.35: sattva-puruṣayor atyantāsaṃkīrṇayoḥ pratyayāviśeṣo bhogaḥ …‘… experience consists in the lack of discrimination in (a given) mental percept between the sattva (viz. the buddhi, the mind) and the real self which are absolutely distinct …)’. Al-Bīrūnī may have misinterpreted the difficult expression avibhāgāpannam (or a similar expression). He may have believed that in this context avibhāga, lit. ‘lack of separation’, refers to a mixture of guṇas. The correct interpretation of the Sanskrit words here is: ‘characterized by lack of discrimination’. This clearly refers to the relationship between the puruṣa ‘self’, and the buddhi ‘mind’. For the Arabic expression 
as a rendering of sattva cf. the latter's meaning ‘purity and goodness’. Cf. e.g. the term sattva-sthaḥ in Maitryupaniṣad 6.30 (pace 
in the singular.
in the singular.
‘knowledge’ of the Arabic text corresponds to prakāśa ‘illumination’ in the sūtra, which is equivalent to sattva, 
‘activity’ corresponds to kriyā ‘action’ which is equivalent to rajas, and 
‘persistence’ corresponds to sthiti ‘inertia, constancy’, which is the equivalent of tamas Ritter reads here 
which presupposes a slight emendation The MS has 
which should probably be read 
A different characterization of the three gunas occurs in 
‥ 
‘‥three powers potentially, not actually, which are called sattva, rajas, and tamas…. The first power is comfort (i e happiness, opposite 
, cf R, p 178, 1. 11, and not ‘rest’ as Sachau translates here) and goodness, and hence come creation (or production; not ‘existence’ as Sachau translates here) and growing The second is exertion and toil (Sachau: ‘exertion and fatigue’), and hence come firmness and duration The third is languor and irresolution, and hence come ruin and perishing Therefore the first power is attributed to the angels, the second to men, the third to the animals’ (cf. 
here cf 
R, p. 170, 1 11 (
can be a literal translation of śakti. For the term 
as used here cf. R, p 170, 1 11 (transl 
. The term 
is rendered above by the word ‘knower’.
may correspond to dṛśi-mātra ‘seeing only’ in sūtra 2.20. For the answer to Q 37 here cf. 
‘… before liberation he existed in the world of entanglement, knowing the objects of knowledge only by a phantasmagoric kind of knowing which he had acquired by absolute exertion, whilst the object of his knowing is still covered, as it were, by a veil. On the contrary, in the world of liberation all veils are lifted, all covers taken off, and obstacles removed. There the being is absolutely knowing, not desirous of learning anything unknown, separated from the soiled perceptions of the senses, united with the everlasting ideas’ (
i.e. the sense-percepts do not possess permanent reality in the way the intellecta do. A Platonic-Aristotelian background is evident in this erroneous translation. Cf. 
. Sūtra 2.26 reads: viveka-khyātir aviplavā hānopāyaḥ ‘The means of this relinquishment is the undisturbed knowledge of the distinction (between puruṣa and prakṛti)’. For the use of the term viveka-khyāti here cf. anyatā-khyāti ‘knowledge of the difference’ in sūtra 3.49.
and 
belong to the vocabulary of the Ṣūfīs. These terms may have been used by al-Bīrūnī to render kaivalya, traditionally understood as ‘isolation’, in translating sūtra 2.25. See next note. On the meaning of the term kaivalya see 
in this context may have been suggested by the Sanskrit artha in the commentary used by him.
here cf.
, 
, lit.: in actu.
group in the Arabic text. The name kārya-vimukti of the first group in the Sanskrit commentaries may have been read by al-Bīrūnī: kāya-vimukti. The word kāya, ‘body’ would correspond to 
, the term by which that group is referred to by al-Bīrūnī. It is by no means impossible that the Sanskrit source used by al-Bīrūnī employed the term kāya-vimukti. Moreover, it might have contained a list comprising seven terms which, contrary to the lists of the extant Sanskrit commentaries, did not essentially differ from al-Bīrūnī's list. In other words, this is one of the passages in al-Bīrūnī's text which may provide a pointer to an otherwise lost Sanskrit tradition. The reading kāya-vimukti suggested by al-Bīrūnī's translation may indicate a way out of a difficulty posed by the following sentence in Vāc. ad loc.: kvacit-pāṭhaḥ kārya-vimuktir iti ‘A different reading is kārya-vimukti’.As kārya-vimukti occurs in the text of Vy. which is commented upon by Vāc., it seems plausible that the ‘different reading’ mentioned by Vāc. may have been kāya-vimukti. For the use of the term prajnā in the sūtra cf. sūtras 1.20, 48, 49; 3.5.
‘eight qualities (or: characteristics)’, which corresponds to aṣṭāv aṅgāni ‘eight parts (or: auxiliaries)’ in the sūtra, may have been suggested to al-Bīrūnī by the Sanskrit expression aṣṭa-guṇa which was perhaps contained in the original commentary used by him, as a description of the aṣṭāṅga-yoga. The expression aṣṭa-guṇa can mean ‘eightfold' and also having eight qualities’. For the use of the compound aṣṭaguṇa to refer to the aṣṭāṅga-yoga cf. Mahābhārata 12.317.5: vedeṣu cāṣṭa-guṇinaṃ yogam āhur manīṣiṇaḥ / sūkṣmam aṣṭa-guṇaṃ prāhur netaraṃ … ‘The wise declare in the Vedas that Yoga has eight characteristics (or: virtues); none other they declare than the subtle eightfold one …’. Cf. 
(
‘abstaining from doing harm’. The term ahiṃsā is traditionally understood as a negative concept: ‘abstention from injury to living beings, harmlessness, nonviolence’. For an exposition of the meaning of this term as fundamentally a positive concept, i.e. ‘gentleness, benevolence’, though expressed by a privative term, see 
has been amended to 
The latter term can mean ‘robbery’ and also ‘violence’.
‘ignorance’ of. e.g. the implicit identification of moha with avidyā by Bhoja ad loc. A parallel statement occurs in India, 
in the singular.
certainly corresponds to nakula ‘mongoose’ in Vāc. under sūtra 2.35: śāśvatika-virodhā apy aśva-mahiṣa-mūṣaka-mārjārāhi-nakulādayo 'pi bhagavataḥ pratiṣṭhitā-hiṃsasya saṃnidhānāt tac-cittānukāriṇo vairaṃ parityajanti ‘Despite their perennial antagonism, even horse and buffalo, mouse and cat, snake and mongoose, etc., on account of proximity to a sage whose non-violence has been consolidated, conform to his mind-stuff and renounce hostility’. Cf. Bhoja ad loc. For the hostile pairs cf. Pāṇini 2.4.9. with Kāśikāvṛtti and Siddhāntakaumudī; Bāṇa's Kādambarī, Parab's ed., 93, Kālidāsa's Śākuntala, Nir. Sāg. ed., 23 (referred to by Woods, p. 186, n. 2). Also cf. the alleged quotation from the Bhagavadgītā in India, Hyd., 458: 
(Sachau (tr.), II, 137: ‘… Vāsudeva says regarding him who seeks salvation: In the judgement of the intelligent man, the Brahman and the Caṇḍāla are equal, the friend and the foe, the faithful and the deceitful, nay, even the serpent and the weasel’).
in all probability renders the Sanskrit svarga ‘heaven’. The interpretation of this sūtra by Vy. and Vāc. is far less plausible than the above by Bhoja. The former interpretation is reflected in Rāma Prasāda's translation: ‘Veracity being confirmed, action and fruition become dependents’ (cf. Lindquist's translation: ‘Wenn er in satya befestigt ist, beruht Handlung und Folge auf ihm’, 
and 
.
. The hypothesis that in the commentary used by al-Bīrūnīi a similar expression may have occurred is supported by the phrase niratiśayam vīryaṃ sāmarthyam ‘limitless manly strength (lit.: capacity)’ in Bhoja ad loc.
(
(
‘are rolled up’. For this of. Vy. on sūtra 2.45: īśvarārpita-sarva-bhāvasya samādhi-siddhir yayā sarvam īpsitam avitathaṃ jānāti deśāntare dehāntare kālāntare ca ‘One whose whole nature is surrendered to the īśvara has perfection of concentration. By which (concentration) he knows as the whole thing really is all that he desires to know, in other places and in other bodies and in other times’ (tr. Woods).
(
here seems to be paralleled by 
‘holiness and purity’ in India, 
This could be read 
or 
. In the context both words can be rendered: ‘magnifies’.
‘The result of practising purity is that a man knows the filth of the body, and that he feels called upon to hate it, and to love cleanness of soul’. The ‘second quality’ refers to the first of the niyama group. See sūtras 2.29 and 2.32.
. Cf. India, 
(
‘The result of tormenting oneself through self-mortification is that a man should reduce the body, allay its feverish desires, and sharpen its senses’.
may be a rendering of sanioṣa. For the expression 
cf. trṣṇā-kṣaya in the following verse quoted by Vy. ad loc.: yac ca kāma-sukhaṃ lake yac ca divyaṃ mahat sukham tṛṣṇā-kṣaya-sukhasyaite nārhataḥ ṣoḍaśīṃ kalām ‘Whatever sensual pleasure there may be in this world and whatever great heavenly pleasure there may be, they cannot equal the sixteenth part of the bliss (that arises) from the cessation of craving’. Also of. Vijñānabhikṣu on Vy. ad loc.: tṛṣṇā-kṣayo hi saṃtoṣaḥ; tṛṣṇā-pratibandhāpagame ca cittasya svābhāvika-sattvādhikya-nimittika sukha-svabhāvatā svata evāvirbhavati na ca tat sukhe viṣayāpekṣeti ‘For contentment is the cessation of craving; when the obstruction (consisting of) craving has vanished, the fact that bliss is an essential property of the mind-stuff, on account of the preponderance of the essential sattva (in the mind-stuff), becomes manifest on its own accord, it does not depend on objects’. The above oft-quoted verse has been traced to the Mahābhārata (Poona ed., 12.168.36) by 
may possibly be a rendering of sukha in the sūtra. For the expression 
cf. tṛṣṇā-pratibandhāpagame… ‘When the obstruction (lit.: ‘binding’) of the craving has vanished…’ in the passage from Vijñānabhikṣu quoted above. For the common idea embodied in the sūtra cf. e.g. Mahābhārata (Poona ed.) 12.287.35a: vistarāḥ kleśa-saṃyuktāḥ saṃkṣepās tu sukhāvahāḥ ‘Vast riches bring sorrow; res angusta, happiness’ (
‘The benefits of giving up hoarding are that one is rid of toil and fatigue; that one is secure from seeking the superfluous; and that one is relieved from the degradation of servitude by the nobility of liberty’. (
here is our proposed emendation of 
which occurs in the printed editions of India.)
. The term 
has been rendered above by ‘chants’ (E, p. 177, 1. 16).
al-Bīrūnī regularly renders the Sanskrit terms deva, devotā. Cf. 
and 
.
may be compared with the Sanskrit expression pratyakṣā (variant: pratyakṣī-) bhavati in the passage quoted above. Both al-Bīrūnī and Bhoja interpret svādhyāya as referring to the recitation of formulae. Cf. Vy. on sūtra 2.1. For 
in the Arabic text here cf. 
‘chants of praise and recitations’ in Answer to Q 24 above, R, p. 177, 1. 16; and cf. 
in India, 
may also refer to a religions practice of Muslim mystics.
may be a rendering of the Sanskrit term samādhi. Cf. Sadāśivendra Sarasvatī ad loc.: samādhiś cittasya samādhānaṃ prasāda iti yāvat 'samādhi is the focusing (lit. ‘putting together’) of the mind-stuff, i.e. settling down peacefully’. Also of. India, 
(
is used by al-Bīrūnī to render the title of the first chapter 
seems to be a rendering of īśvara-praṇidhānāt in the sūtra. For such an understanding of the latter term of. e.g. Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha on sūtra 2.1: praṇidhānam = stuty-ādi-janitā bhaktiḥ ‘The term praṇidhāna means (a type of) devotion generated by chants of praise, etc.’.
here cf. the parallel expression in India, 
‘the complete suppression of motion’. For the concept of āsana as presented in the sūtra cf. Bhagavadgītā 6.13: samaṃ. kāya-śīro-grīvaṃ dhārayann acalṃm sthiraḥ… ‘holding the body, head, and neck erect and motionless (keeping himself) steady …’ (cf. Śvetāśvataropaniṣad 2.8, and especially, op. cit., 2.9: saṃyukta-ceṣṭaḥ ‘one who has controlled his movements’).
has been rendered above by ‘relaxes’ The whole sentence m the Arabic text here corresponds to sūtra 2.48: tato dvandvānabhighātah ‘Consequently (the yogm) is unaffected by the pairs (of extremes)’. Cf. India, 
(
(
cf. R, p. 170, 1 2: 
. See 
is not obligatory.
…).
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