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Rise of Mandatory Human Rights Due Diligence: A Beacon of Hope or a Double-Edged Sword?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 June 2021

Gabriela QUIJANO Open the ORCID record for Gabriela QUIJANO [Opens in a new window]  and
Carlos LOPEZ Open the ORCID record for Carlos LOPEZ [Opens in a new window]
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Abstract

This article discusses the evolution, current trends, limitations and controversies around the understanding and practice of human rights due diligence (HRDD), a concept developed in the course of the work of United Nations (UN)-mandate holder, John Ruggie, and enshrined in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. While the concept has gathered broad acceptance and a growing number of legislative proposals are seeking to entrench it in law, significant differences of opinion exist among stakeholders as to its nature, objectives and relationship, if any, with legal liability. These differing understandings are at play in a contest to shape future legislation. Some of these carry significant risks for rights-holders, notably the risk of outcome being superseded by process and superficial, compliance-oriented HRDD prevailing in the law or in its interpretation and practice. As legislative efforts continue, the authors warn against the risk of hollow laws which do little to change the status quo or, even worse, inadvertently provide a tool to further impunity for business-related human rights abuses.

Keywords

cosmetic compliancehuman rights due diligencelegal liabilityremedyUNGPs
Type
Scholarly Articles – Special Issue on “BHR Landscape after 10 years of the UNGPs: An Assessment”
Information
Business and Human Rights Journal , Volume 6 , Issue 2: Special Issue: BHR Landscape after 10 years of the UNGPs: An Assessment , June 2021 , pp. 241 - 254
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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Footnotes

Conflicts of interest: The authors declare none.

*

Independent business and human rights specialist.

**

Senior Legal Advisor, International Commission of Jurists. The content of this article reflects the author’s individual opinions and may not be attributed to the institution to which he is affiliated.

References

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2 European Coalition for Corporate Justice (ECCJ), ‘Commissioner Reynders Announces EU Corporate Due Diligence Legislation’, https://corporatejustice.org/news/16806-commissioner-reynders-announces-eu-corporate-due-diligence-legislation (accessed 9 December 2020).

3 BHRRC, ‘List of Large Businesses, Associations & Investors with Public Statements & Endorsements in Support of Mandatory Due Diligence Regulation’, https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/list-of-large-businesses-associations-investors-with-public-statements-endorsements-in-support-of-mandatory-due-diligence-regulation/ (accessed 9 December 2020).

4 Bonnitcha, Jonathan and McCorquodale, Robert, ‘The Concept of Due Diligence in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ (2017) 28:3 The European Journal of International Law 901–902.Google Scholar

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6 Human Rights Council, ‘Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises’, A/HRC/RES/17/4 (6 July 2011).

7 See, e.g., Shift, ‘Putting the UNGPs into Practice’, https://shiftproject.org/what-we-do/putting-ungp-into-practice/ (accessed 9 December 2020).

8 ECCJ and CORE Coalition, ‘Debating Mandatory Human Rights Due Diligence Legislation (and corporate liability). A Reality check’ (November 2020), https://corporatejustice.org/debating-mhrdd-legislation---a-reality-check.pdf (accessed 9 December 2020).

9 German Federal Foreign Office, ‘Monitoring the National Action Plan for Business and Human Rights (NAP)’ (13 October 2020), https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/aussenpolitik/themen/aussenwirtschaft/wirtschaft-und-menschenrechte/monitoring-nap/2131054 (accessed 9 December 2020).

10 BHRRC, note 1. See also 6th Session of the Open Ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights (26–30 October 2020),

https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Session6/Pages/Session6.aspx (accessed 9 December 2020).

11 Joint NGO Letter in response to the interim report of the UN Special Representative on Human Rights and Business (18 May 2006), https://www.escr-net.org/docs/i/430932 (accessed 9 December 2020). See also Amnesty International, ‘Letter to Special Representative on Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises’ (26 April 2006), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ior50/002/2006/en/ (accessed 9 December 2020).

12 Nicolas Bueno and Claire Bright, ‘Implementing Human Rights Due Diligence Through Corporate Civil Liability’ (2020) 69:4 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 789, 800–801. The authors add a third category of laws, with reporting obligations only, to implement the UNGPs.

13 French Code of Commerce, Art L225-102-5, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000034291364/2017-03-29 (accessed 9 December 2020).

14 Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas.

15 Voorstel van wet van het lid Van Laar houdende de invoering van een zorgplicht ter voorkoming van de levering van goederen en diensten die met behulp van kinderarbeid tot stand zijn gekomen (Wet zorgplicht kinderarbeid), https://www.eerstekamer.nl/9370000/1/j9vvkfvj6b325az/vkbklq11jgyy/f=y.pdfhttps:/www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000034290626&categorieLien=id (accessed 9 December 2020).

16 A popular initiative allows Swiss citizens to request an amendment to the Federal Constitution. For more detail on the legal proposal, see Swiss Coalition for Corporate Justice (SCCJ), ‘The Initiative Text with Explanations’, https://corporate-responsibility.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/KVI_Factsheet_5_E.pdf (accessed 9 December 2020).

17 SCCJ, ‘The Main Differences Between the Counter-proposal and the Initiative’, https://corporatejustice.ch/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/initiativecounter-proposal_e.pdf (accessed 9 December 2020).

18 SCCJ, ‘Parliament Dumps Compromise Proposal, the public will have final say on initiative’, https://corporatejustice.ch/press-release/the-multinational-corporations-lobbyists-have-won-the-day-in-parliament-the-initiative-will-be-put-before-the-public-for-a-vote/ (accessed 9 December 2020).

19 Ibid. Citing media reports, SCCJ alleged that the business association SwissHoldings lobbied the Department of Justice for a weak counterproposal. SCCJ, ‘Stages of the Responsible Business Initiative in Parliament’, https://corporatejustice.ch/stages-in-parliament/ (accessed 9 December 2020).

20 Jessica Davis Plüs, ‘Responsible Business Initiative Rejected at the Ballot Box’, SwissInfo.ch (29 November 2020), https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/swiss-to-vote-on-holding-companies-accountable-for-supply-chain-abuses/46184500 (accessed 9 December 2020).

21 Sandra Cossart, Jérôme Chaplier and Tiphaine Beau de Loménie, ‘The French Law on Duty of Care: a Historic Step Towards Making Globalization Work for All’ (2017) 2 Business and Human Rights Journal 317.

22 Robert McCorquodale and Lise Smit, ‘Human Rights, Responsibilities and Due Diligence’ in Surya Deva and David Bilchiltz (eds), Building a Treaty on Business and Human Rights: Context and Contours (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017) 216, 224–225.

23 Human Rights Council, ‘Business and Human Rights: Towards Operationalizing the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’, A/HRC/11/13 (22 April 2009), para 71. The same concept is restated by the WGBHR in its 2018 report to the General Assembly. UN General Assembly, ‘The report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises’, A/73/163 (16 July 2018), para 10.

24 For example, remarks by Clifford Chance partner, Rae Lindsay, at a Brick Court Chambers’ online seminar on Business Responsibility for Human Rights (20 November 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rbf2imllBYM (accessed 9 December 2020). See also Damilola S Olawuyi, ‘Corporate Due Diligence in the Era of Climate Change’, https://www.asser.nl/media/680257/damilola-olawuyi-corporate-due-diligence-in-the-era-of-climate-change.pdf (accessed 9 December 2020).

25 For example, remarks by Responsible Business Alliance CEO, Rob Lederer, at the OECD’s Special stakeholder session on Regulatory Developments Concerning Due Diligence for Responsible Business Conduct (5 November 2020).

26 See, e.g., Gwynne Skinner, Robert McCorquodale and Olivier De Schutter, ‘The Third Pillar – Access to Judicial Remedies for Human Rights Violations by Transnational Business’ (December 2013) prepared at the request of ICAR, ECCJ and CORE, 76–77.

27 Bonnitcha and McCorquodale, note 4, 900–901.

28 Ibid, 908–909, 914.

29 Ibid, 912–919.

30 See, e.g., ECCJ, ‘Principles and Pathways: Legal Opportunities to Improve Europe’s Corporate Accountability Framework’ (29 November 2010), 20, https://corporatejustice.org/documents/publications/eccj/eccj_principles_pathways_webuseblack.pdf (accessed 9 December 2020).

31 British Institute for International and Comparative Law (BIICL) et al, ‘Study on Due Diligence Requirements through the Supply Chain’ (January 2020), 260, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/8ba0a8fd-4c83-11ea-b8b7-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

(accessed 9 December 2020).

32 Olivier De Schutter, Towards Mandatory Due Diligence in Global Supply Chains (ITUC, 2020), 52–56. See also, on the basis of this study, ITUC, ‘Towards Mandatory Due Diligence in Global Supply Chains’, 12–13, https://www.ituc-csi.org/towards_mandatory_due_diligence 12-13 (accessed 9 December 2020).

33 For example, IOE statement, ‘Panel on Liability (draft article 8)’, 6th Session of the UN Open Ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights (26–30 October 2020).

34 For example, Amnesty International and BHRRC, ‘Creating a paradigm shift: legal solutions to improve access to remedy for corporate human rights abuse’ (4 September 2017), 7, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/POL3070372017ENGLISH.PDF (accessed 9 December 2020).

35 BIICL, note 31, 16–17. See also IOE statement, ‘Panel III, Subtheme 1 – Examples of international instruments addressing obligations and responsibilities of private actors’, 2nd Session of the UN Open Ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights (24–28 October 2016).

36 BIICL, note 31, 17. See also BIAC et al, ‘UN Treaty Process on Business and Human Rights – Initial Observations by the International Business Community on a Way Forward’ (29 June 2015), 3, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Session1/IOE_contribution.pdf (accessed 9 December 2020).

37 Surya Deva, ‘A just recovery for whom? And how to achieve it?’, https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/blog/a-just-recovery-for-whom-and-how-to-achieve-it/ (accessed 23 February 2021).

38 Landau, Ingrid, ‘Human Rights Due Diligence and the Risk of Cosmetic Compliance’ (2019) 20:1 Melbourne Journal of International Law 238 Google Scholar. Mares, Radu, ‘Respect Human Rights: Concept and Convergence’ in Bird, Robert C, Cahoy, Daniel R and Prenkert, Jamie D (eds), Law, Business and Human Rights: Bridging the Gap (Edward Elgar, 2014) 43.Google Scholar

39 Landau, note 38, 234–235. Kimberly D Krawiec, ‘Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance’ (2003) 81:1 Washington University Law Quarterly 487.

40 WGBHR, note 23, para 26. As concluded by a coalition of NGOs examining the first year of implementation of the French duty of vigilance law: ‘Most of the companies reviewed merely transpose their reporting practices or social liability commitments into their vigilance plans’. Amnesty International et al, ‘The Law on Duty of Vigilance of Parent and Outsourcing Companies. Year 1: Companies Must Do Better’ (February 2019), 15, https://corporatejustice.org/2019_collective_report_-_duty_of_vigilance_year_1.pdf (accessed 9 December 2020). Also cautioning against this risk, Cidse, ‘Human Rights Due Diligence Policy Measures for Effective Implementation’ (September 2013), 11, https://media.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/files/documents/HRDD_EN_Final.pdf (accessed 9 December 2020).

41 Landau, note 38, 235–238.

42 Existing reporting obligations such as those enshrined in the EU Non-Financial Reporting Directive and ‘Conflict Minerals’ Regulation are limited in scope. Others are poorly complied with. See, e.g., Independent Review of the Modern Slavery Act 2015: Final Report (2019), 39, 43 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/803554/Independent_review_of_the_Modern_Slavery_Act_-_final_report__print_.pdf (accessed 9 December 2020).

43 To avoid this risk, the US Department of Justice’s Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations make very clear that, in the context of criminal prosecutions, ‘the existence of a compliance program is not sufficient, in and of itself, to justify not charging a corporation for criminal misconduct undertaken by its officers, directors, employees, or agents.’ US Department of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations (accessed 9 December 2020).

44 ECCJ and Core, note 8, 7.

45 For example, British Institute of International and Comparative Law (BIICL), ‘A UK Failure to Prevent Mechanism for Corporate Human Rights Harms’ (February 2020), 51, https://www.biicl.org/publications/a-uk-failure-to-prevent-mechanism-for-corporate-human-rights-harms (accessed 9 December 2020). See also Cassell, Douglass, ‘Outlining the Case for a Common Law Duty of Care of Business to Exercise Human Rights Due Diligence’ (2016) 1:2 Business and Human Rights Journal 180.Google Scholar

46 BIICL, note 31, 264–265 (quoting the Dutch case Eric Barizaa Dooh of Goi and others v Royal Dutch Shell and English jurisprudence to exemplify this point).

47 Michalowski, Sabine, ‘Due Diligence and Complicity: A Relationship in need of Clarification’ in Deva, Surya and Bilchitz, David (eds), Human Rights Obligations of Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 218 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

48 Bohoslavsky, Juan Pablo, Fernandez, Karina and Smart, Sebastian (eds), Complicidad Económica con la Dictadura Chilena: un País Desigual a la Fuerza (Lom Ediciones, 2019)Google Scholar. Bohoslavsky, Juan Pablo and Verbitsky, Horacio (eds), The Economic Accomplices to the Argentine Dictatorship – Outstanding Debts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2015)Google Scholar. See also Human Rights Council, ‘Guiding Principles on Human Rights Impact Assessments of Economic Reforms’, A/HRC/40/57 (28 February 2019).

49 Causas ‘Ford’. Tribunal Oral en lo Criminal Federal No. 1 de San Martin, Fundamentos de la Sentencia Dictada en las Causas No. 2855 y 2358 (15 March 2019).

50 Amnesty International, ‘Destination: Occupation. Digital Tourism and Israel’s Illegal Settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories’ (30 January 2019), 76, 84–85, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE1594902019ENGLISH.PDF (accessed 9 December 2020).

51 End Uyghur Forced Labour, ‘Call to Action on Human Rights Abuses in the Uyghur Region in the Apparel and Textiles Sector’ (October 2020), https://enduyghurforcedlabour.org/call-to-action/ (accessed 9 December 2020).

52 UN General Assembly, ‘Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises – Business, human rights and conflict-affected regions: towards heightened action’, A/75/21 (21 July 2020), para 13.

53 Ibid, para 64.