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Regulatory power, post-crisis transatlantic disputes, and the network structure of the financial industry
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 February 2017
Abstract
The international financial crisis was followed by waves of domestic regulatory reforms, first and foremost, in the United States and the European Union. Post-crisis financial regulation was sometimes different across jurisdictions. Moreover, the United States and the European Union sought in various ways to (re)assert their regulatory power not only vis-à-vis the market, but also with regard to other jurisdictions, which often resisted the projection of regulatory power beyond national borders. Consequently, a handful of important post-crisis transatlantic regulatory disputes emerged concerning E.U. rules on hedge funds, U.S. rules on bank structure and E.U. and U.S. rules on over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives. These disputes mainly involved the terms of access to each other's markets, the equivalence between domestic rules, and the extraterritorial effects of those rules. Some of these disputes were also intra-E.U. disagreements, whenever the preferences of the United Kingdom were different from those of Continental countries and similar to those of the United States. The network structure of the financial industry and the patterns of financial interdependence across the Atlantic amplified the extra territorial effects of domestic reforms, but at the same time triggered an active involvement of the transnational financial industry in the management and, eventually, the settlement of these disputes.
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- Business and Politics , Volume 19 , Special Issue 2: Property Rights, Financial Risk, and the Politics of a Networked Global Financial System , June 2017 , pp. 241 - 266
- Copyright
- Copyright © V.K. Aggarwal 2017 and published under exclusive license to Cambridge University Press
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