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Firm-specific characteristics, political connections, and financial outcomes: Evidence from Indian firms

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 February 2022

Surender Rao Komera Open the ORCID record for Surender Rao Komera [Opens in a new window]  and
Santosh Kumar Tiwari
Surender Rao Komera*
Affiliation:
Indian Institute of Management Amritsar, Inside Govt. Polytechnic Campus, GT Road, Chheharta, Amritsar – 143105; Punjab, India
Santosh Kumar Tiwari
Affiliation:
Indian Institute of Management Amritsar, Inside Govt. Polytechnic Campus, GT Road, Chheharta, Amritsar – 143105; Punjab, India
*
*Corresponding author: Surender Rao Komera, Emails: surenderraogp@gmail.com, surender@iimamritsar.ac.in
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Abstract

Our selection and endogeneity corrected findings suggest that firms' political connections negatively influence their market value. We find that firms with a larger size, more operationally efficient in utilizing their assets, and those operating in more concentrated industries benefit more from the political connections than the otherwise corresponding firms. We also report that political connections do not influence firms' leverage choices. However, we find that politically connected firms with higher leverage have significantly lower market value. Further, we note that political connections help the firms operating in unregulated but more concentrated industries, probably to obtain ‘private benefits’, leading to their higher market value. Overall, our results indicate that the effect of political connections is not homogeneous across the sample firms. They also raise questions on the motivation of sample firms' political connections, suggesting that these firms probably obtain political connections for reasons other than enhancing their market value.

Keywords

political connectionsmarket valueleverageconcentrated industries
Type
Research Article
Information
Business and Politics , Volume 24 , Issue 2 , June 2022 , pp. 188 - 220
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of V.K. Aggarwal

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