Are club goods becoming more widespread in developed economies, and, if so, what is the broader significance of this trend? Club goods are as salient for the profitability of non-financial firms as for finance. First, corporate strategy today largely revolves around the generation or acquisition of intellectual property rights and other club/franchise goods. Second, financialization is not just about the credit relationship between financial firms on the one side and non-financial corporate and household borrowers on the other, but also about Main Street's ability to use financial power to suppress competition in its own markets. Third, firms’ strategic reliance on IPRs and club goods more generally has magnified both profit and wage inequality in the broader economy. This inequality combines with changes in corporate structure to produce a significant part of the household level income inequality we currently observe in the United States. Fourth, all these processes are ineluctably political, because the state necessarily constitutes club or franchise goods, just like any property right. But the quantity and quality of those property rights is an indeterminate outcome of struggles among firms over the size of and shares of the pool of profits in a given national and global economy.

This paper compares the economic efficiency of firm-agency governance structures for pollution reduction using transaction costs economics. Two governance structures are analyzed with the transaction costs approach: command and control regulation (CCR) and negotiated agreements (NAs). We propose that the choice of governance structure depends on the strategies firms pursue given the attributes of their transactions and their market opportunities. The application of transaction cost economics analysis leads to different choices of regulatory instruments. Firms in more mature, stable industries are likely to choose command and control, while firms in new, dynamic sectors are more likely to opt for negotiated agreements. Frequency of transactions is a key factor in firm choice.

We contribute to the post-crisis literature on macroeconomic stability by arguing that polycentric banking systems can better achieve stability than monocentric systems. Building on the theories of E. Ostrom, we engage the literature on free banking systems to show that these systems met the requirements of polycentric governance systems, and that the unintentional result of the underlying governance institutions was macroeconomic stability. In contrast, modern central banking, because it is monocentric, lacks important features regarding knowledge aggregation and incentive compatibility conducive to generating macroeconomic stability. We conclude by discussing various legal barriers that stand in the way of a transition from monetary monocentrism to monetary polycentrism.

Interest groups face many choices when lobbying: when, who, and how to lobby. We study interest group lobbying across two stages of regulatory policymaking: the congressional and agency rulemaking stages. We investigate how the Securities and Exchange Commission responds to interest groups at the end of these stages using a new, comprehensive lobbying dataset on the Dodd-Frank Act. Our approach examines citations in the SEC's final rules which reference and acknowledge the lobbying activities of specific interest groups. We find that more than 2,900 organizations engaged in different types of lobbying activities either during the congressional bill stage, the agency rulemaking stage, or both. Meetings with the SEC and hiring former SEC employees are strongly associated with the citation of an organization in a final rule. Comments submitted by trade associations and members of Congress are cited more in a final rule compared to other organizations. While there is more variety in the types of organizations who lobby the bureaucracy than those who lobby Congress, presence does not necessarily lead to recognition or influence.

This paper explores the role of the state for an effective engagement of multinational corporations (MNCs) in corporate social responsibility (CSR). In the OECD context, the “shadow of hierarchy” cast by the state is considered an important incentive for MNCs to engage in CSR activities that contribute to governance. However, in areas of limited statehood, where state actors are too weak to effectively set and enforce collectively binding rules, profit-driven MNCs confront various dilemmas with respect to costly CSR standards. The lack of a credible regulatory threat by state agencies is therefore often associated with the exploitation of resources and people by MNCs, rather than with business’ social conduct. However, in this paper we argue that there are alternatives to the “shadow of hierarchy” that induce MNCs to adopt and implement CSR policies that contribute to governance in areas of limited statehood. We then discuss that in certain areas such functional equivalents still depend on some state intervention to be effective, in particular when firms are immune to reputational concerns and in complex-task areas that require the involvement of several actors in the provision of collective goods. Finally, we discuss the “dark side” of the state and show that the state can also have negative effects on the CSR engagement of MNCs. We illustrate the different ways in which statehood and the absence thereof affect CSR activities of MNCs in South Africa and conclude with some considerations on the conditions under which statehood exerts these effects.

This paper provides a comparative perspective of public procurement policies for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) in the United States and Europe. Public procurement is increasingly recognized as a strategic function of public administration because of the huge amount of resources it consumes, as well as the important policy objectives it seeks to promote, including SME-related objectives. Progress towards meeting SME procurement participation goals, however, remains elusive on both sides of the Atlantic. Policy makers and administrators have little comparative research upon which to draw regarding the effectiveness of various policy approaches, a shortcoming this paper seeks to address. An institutional perspective is adopted which helps explain similarities and differences in U.S. and European SME policies.

Does the cross-border strategic behavior of large firms reflect national differences? There is uncertainty about the ways in which expanding markets will influence the activities of large firms and national governments. Some theorists expect market forces to produce increasing pressure for uniform patterns of behavior, while others have argued that the national political economy is more resilient, and that corporate strategies remain identifiably national. Thus far the question, theoretically and empirically, has been posed in terms of economic behavior and consequences. We analyze the persistence of national practices in the political activities of large corporations using data on the Fortune 1000 industrial and service companies for 1988. To increase the sample of affiliates of foreign firms, we include firms in the Forbes ranking of largest U.S. affiliates of foreign firms. This source includes financial and service corporations as well as those in manufacturing industries. Overall, the findings suggest that, contrary to the national capitalism argument, firms adapt to the host political economy.

This paper examines the degree to which political connections affect business rankings through a statistical analysis of Turkey's industry rankings between 2003 and 2011. The analysis demonstrates that business performance is associated with connectedness through industry and firm level data. We show that political connectedness varies according to the firm's channel of access to obtain favouritism either through direct personal ties or institutional networks. Ideological motivations emerge to be significant in mobilizing, shaping and tying firm behaviour to broader political agendas. In the conclusion we discuss the impact of deepening connectedness on long-term business fortunes and political institutions.

In this paper we deconstruct the popular book by Thomas Friedman which argues that the world is integrated through the advent of a new form of globalization based on the Internet. We use the logic of international business strategy to demonstrate that Friedman's examples of worldwide integration are special cases which ignore the empirical realities of multinational enterprises (MNEs). We provide empirical evidence to demonstrate that the world's largest MNEs do not operate globally, but sell and produce the vast majority of their output within their home region of the triad. We develop a new analytical framework to explain the limited nature of Friedman's thinking, and we contrast this with the more robust frameworks available in international business. The latter frameworks, which take into account country level and regional level barriers to integration, are better at explaining the activities of MNEs. We conclude that, from the viewpoint of international business strategy, the prescriptive thinking from Friedman is misleading if it is believed that a global strategy is feasible. Instead, MNEs need to develop strategies to accommodate the realities of intra-regional integration and to overcome the liabilities of inter-regional expansion across the triad.

Multinational companies (MNCs) shape their nonmarket strategies in response to the social and political context in which they operate. Empirical evidence shows that these strategies frequently fall into one of two categories: they either consist of a disparate portfolio of disconnected country-level social and political programs or are composed of standardized corporate policies that are applied uniformly across geographies. The former type of strategy implies that MNC managers view their firm's context as extremely fragmented across country borders, while the latter reflects the perception of a highly homogeneous international environment. Yet, most industries and firms operate in a semi-globalized socio-political context. In this paper we propose that producing strategies that truly fit with the specific characteristics of an MNC's nonmarket context requires that this context be defined along four dimensions: stakeholders, issues, networks, and geography. Conceptualizing an MNC socio-political context in this way broadens dramatically the strategic choices of MNC managers. We illustrate the use of our model by describing four socio-political contexts frequently encountered by MNCs, and showing how alternative nonmarket strategies seem a better option than the standard “one-size-fits-all” or “every-country-a-different-strategy” approaches of today.

From the 1970s to the 1990s, British Telecom (BT), the main telecommunications operator in Britain, underwent a dramatic revolution. The former public administration, often considered inefficient and hardly innovative, became a private company, and now aims to become one of the most dynamic giant telecom players, delivering everything from simple voice calls to advanced eCommerce services all over the world. These changes in the market arena were accompanied by some wide changes in the nonmarket arena, i.e. the institutional and regulatory environment of the British telecom market. This case study analyzes the changes in these two arenas to understand how market and nonmarket strategies may be combined by British Telecom to generate a competitive advantage in a deregulated environment.

There has been considerable attention in recent years on the close linkages between business, ethics, and economic development and how businesses not only have responsibilities to their shareholders but also to wider society. The growing power and influence of emerging economies has resulted in increased scholarly interest in China on studying the domestic political commitments to corporate social responsibility strategies (CSR), and their potential contribution to promoting the country's ambitious Belt and Road Initiative and thereby achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This article explores the factors that influence CSR strategies and performance and examines whether we are witnessing the emergence of a new form of social responsibility among Chinese businesses that prioritizes sustainable development. In order to better understand how CSR strategies in China are being potentially reshaped and realigned with the SDGs, we examined the CSR reports and practices of selected Chinese companies both before and after the adoption of the SDGs at the United Nations in 2015. By focusing on the CSR-SDG linkages in China, our study contributes to a better understanding of state advocacy aimed at influencing corporate behavior on sustainable development.

While the literature on political action committees' (PACs) contributions to congressional campaigns is substantial, one key variable has been missing: the ideology of the PAC. Such a measure is needed to evaluate a normatively important yet unanswered question: to what extent do PACs give to candidates with whom they agree ideologically, as opposed to candidates they may want to influence after the election? This study shows that many interest groups' preferences for an electoral strategy or an access strategy can be predicted by their left-right ideology and their level of ideological extremism. The analysis finds that more ideologically extreme groups and more liberal groups spend more money on PAC contributions relative to lobbying. Further, groups' underlying left-right ideology is also highly predictive of their allocation of PAC contributions between the two parties—even controlling for group type.

Business has been involved in cooperation with multilateral organizations through public-private partnerships (PPPs) since the late 1990s. With their adoption of the sustainable development goals (SDGs), multilateral institutions increasingly consider partnerships as a means to achieve their goals given their own limited implementation capacity. However, the global economic order has changed significantly since the first expansion of PPPs, particularly due to growing participation by non-western states and companies. This article asks how this shift has changed the eagerness to form partnerships, as well as their qualitative content. It analyzes the 3964 partnerships in the SDG partnership registry, focusing on the subset of them that includes business partners. We divide these into five groups: local implementation, resource mobilization, advocacy, policy, and operational partnerships. We study PPPs involving companies from different varieties of capitalism—private, market based forms, and state-led forms of capitalism. We find that PPPs are still dominated by companies and other actors from Western countries. Moreover, business participate more in U.S.- and Canadian-led partnerships than others. We also find strong differences regarding what category of PPPs that companies from different backgrounds engage in, and discuss the linkages between varieties of capitalism and PPP participation.

Research on conflict in resource-rich countries suggests that resource extraction companies contribute to tension but not development. In recent times, public-private partnerships (PPPs) have flourished, in which set up regulation is not against business but in joint cooperation with corporate actors. Yet PPPs are criticized for serving business self-interest and increasing business power rather than the common good. The paper takes the Kimberley Process and the diamond industry as an example to examine the multi-faceted nature of business power when this PPP was negotiated. The core of the argument is that realist-informed perspectives about business power in PPPs and constructivist accounts emphasizing socialization and social learning processes only tell one part of the story. While demonstrating that the diamond industry acted as a both a socializing and socialized agent, the analysis of the different facets of power shows that structural and discursive power were crucial elements in making socialization happen in the first place.

This paper examines the interplay between leading international and American accounting authorities over the span of a critical four-year period, 2001–2005. Historically, US regulators and private-sector accounting institutions have taken a cautious approach to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs), citing the superior rigor and overall quality of their own Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). During the past four years, however, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) have each become markedly receptive to the International Accounting Standards Board's (IASB) efforts to harmonize accounting standards worldwide based on IFRSs. Why? This paper offers an explanation that highlights the role of the high-profile American corporate scandals (2001–2002) in precipitating a shift in US accounting authorities' views of the optimal form of accounting rules, an issue that has stood in the way of trans-Atlantic accounting standard convergence. Prior to the accounting scandals, the highly-detailed rules that are characteristic of US GAAP were widely seen to be the most effective form of accounting rule. Since 2002, a normative shift has taken place such that the SEC now endorses objectives-oriented rules that are conceptually aligned with the principles-based standards promulgated by the IASB. The analysis is framed by insights from contemporary International Relations theory which emphasize the influence of scope conditions on patterns of governance.

The paper examines the use of free trade agreements (FTAs) by Japanese firms. The FTAs analyzed include Japan's FTAs with Mexico, Malaysia and Chile. Based on 1,688 responses to a questionnaire survey conducted in 2008, the study finds that the utilization rate of FTAs ranges between 32.9% (Japan-Mexico FTA) and 12.2% (Japan-Malaysia FTA). The survey results and the statistical analysis of the determinants of the use of FTAs reveal obstacles to using FTAs that include difficulty in obtaining the certificate of origin that is required to use the FTA, lack of knowledge of FTAs, and the small FTA tariff preference that is the difference between the most-favored-nation (MFN) and FTA tariff rates.

Scholars have started to focus on the ways in which firms manage their reputations through collective action. Collective reputation management is most often carried out through trade associations (TAs). But what do these TAs actually do? How do they further their members' interests with stakeholders like regulators, industry financial analysts, employees, suppliers, and the media? Informed by a rich set of 43 qualitative interviews with the trade associations (TAs) representing the UK's 24 largest business sectors, the paper builds a model of the reputational incentives that drives the dynamic relationship between trade associations, firms and multiple stakeholder groups. The paper's preliminary empirical research coupled with the conceptual model provides five directions for future research.

Multinational firms unavoidably exert influence over politics through power that is generated by both structure and process. While both political economy and management scholars address international firms, neither field has an adequate understanding of the reciprocal relationship between multinational firms and geopolitical systems. The links between multinational firms form a distinct type of international system for the private sector – one that is simultaneously enmeshed in geopolitics and international markets even as it is also autonomous from them. The scholarly literature on the power of business in politics has demonstrated how influence derives from instrumental agency as well as structural influence, but it has taken an unnecessarily restrictive view of politics and an overly materialist theory of power. Politics are about much more than government policies. In this paper I propose an analytical framework for understanding the multinational firm as a set of relationships. I then apply one key element of that approach – the relationships among firms as a direct source of geopolitical outcomes – to the natural gas trade of Eurasia in three eras that span nearly 40 years. I conclude that the influence of business on a broader understanding of politics – and not just policies – should be central to the study of international and comparative political economy.

With increasing fragmentation of worldwide production chains and the corresponding contracting relations between companies, the “firm as an inspector” has become a frequent phenomenon. Buyer firms deploy supervising activities over their suppliers' products and production processes in order to ensure their compliance with regulatory standards, thereby taking on tasks commonly performed by public authorities. Why would a firm engage in such activities? In this article we will analyze the conditions under which firms play the role of an inspector vis-à-vis their sub-contractor firms to guarantee compliance with quality and environmental regulations. We develop a theoretical argument based on transaction cost economics and institutionalism to offer hypothetical answers to this question and provide an empirical assessment of our hypotheses.