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Challenging the Egoistic Paradigm

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 January 2015

Norman E. Bowie*
Affiliation:
University of Minnesota

Abstract

Most economists are committed to some version of egoism. After distinguishing among the various sorts of egoistic claims, I cite the empirical literature against psychological egoism and show that attempts to account for this data make these economists’ previous empirical claims tautological. Moreover, the assumption of egoism has undesirable consequences, especially for students; if people believe that others behave egoistically, they are more likely to behave egoistically themselves. As an alternative to egoism I recommend the commitment model of Robert Frank.

The equivalent of egoism at the organizational level is that business firms seek (should seek) to maximize profits. I present arguments to show that a conscious attempt by managers to maximize profits is likely to fail. A committed altruism is more likely to raise profits. I suggest that a firm should take as its primary purpose providing meaningful work for employees.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Society for Business Ethics 1991

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References

Notes

The author is indebted to University of Minnesota professors Philip Bromiley and Larry Cummings of the Carlson School of Management and to Professor Ronald Giere of the Department of Philosophy and to Professor Donald Schied of the Department of Philosophy at Winona State University for their helpful comments. This paper is a revised version of my Presidential Address delivered to the Society for Business Ethics, August 1988.

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6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

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