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The Language of International Corporate Ethics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 January 2015

Thomas Donaldson
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Abstract

This paper identifies six basic languages of morals and shows that while in general it is impossible to say that one moral language is better, some languages are better for the purpose of characterizing international corporate responsibility. In particular, moral languages that imly minimum rather than perfectionist standards of behavior, and which are not overly dependent on analogy with human moral psychology, are better than ones ranging broadly over both minimum and maximum standards and requiring analogy to human beings. Languages based in rights and duties, avoidance of harm, and social contracts, are better for understanding international corporate ethics than ones based in virtues, self control, or the maximization of human happiness.

Type
Articles
Information
Business Ethics Quarterly , Volume 2 , Issue 3 , July 1992 , pp. 271 - 281
Copyright
Copyright © Society for Business Ethics 1992

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References

Notes

1 The term “agent-centered” implies that one's motives, i.e., what one aims at, and not merely the actual consequences of one's act, are relevant to the evaluation of the act.

2 For a definition and discussion of consequentialism as one aspect of utilitarianism, see Anthony, Ellis, “The Idea of Utilitarianism,” in Traditions of Ethics in International Affairs (ed. Terrence, Nardin) (Cambridge University Press, 1991) Chapter 8.Google Scholar

3 Michael Keeley has used the notion of the avoidance of harm as a keystone principle in defining the moral responsibility of corporations. See Michael, Keeley, A Social Contract Theory of Organizations (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988).Google Scholar

4 Immanuel, Kant, trans. Beck, L.W.. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1959).Google Scholar

5 An attempt to construct a list of ten fundamental international rights, and to use these rights in defining the moral responsibilities of the multinational corporation is found in Thomas, Donaldson, The Ethics of International Business (Oxford University Press, 1989), Chapter 5.Google Scholar

6 John, Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971);Google Scholar and John, Rawls, “Fairness to Goodness,” Philosophical Review, vol. 84 (1975), pp. 536–54.Google Scholar

7 David, Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford University Press, 1986);Google Scholar and David, Gauthier, “The Unity of Reason: a Subversive Reinterpretation of Kant,” Ethics, vol. 96, pp. 74–88.Google Scholar

8 Thomas, Donaldson and Thomas, W. Dunfee, “Integrative Social Contracts Theory: Ethics in Economic Life,” (working paper).Google Scholar

9 Many people have attempted to synthesize underlying similarities from the above six languages, one of the most successful being the attempt by the Institute of Moralogy in An Outline of Moralogy: A New Approach to Moral Science, (Tokyo, Japan: The Institute of Moralogy, 1987).Google Scholar

10 See, for example, Shelly, Kagan, The Limits of Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).Google Scholar

11 Thomas, Donaldson, The Ethics of International Business (Oxford University Press, 1989).Google Scholar

12 Immanuel, Kant, The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue, tr. James, Ellington, (New York: Bobbs-Merril, 1964), p. 48.Google Scholar

13 Extraordinary conditions are capable of creating exceptions to the principle. For example, suppose that an earthq uake devastates a host country and that thousands of local residents are dying for want of blood. Suppose further that the branch of a multinational corporation happens to possess the means to provide blood on a short-term basis and hence save thousands of lives, while the local government does not. In such an instance, the company may have a minimal duty to aid in the rescue; that is to say, it may have a correlative duty (correlative to the right of persons to physical security) to help aid the deprived.

Such exceptions have analogues in the realm of individual action. For example, normally we do not consider helping a particular person in distress a “perfect” duty, i.e., a duty that one must perform. That is, while we may regard helping people in distress a duty, we allow considerable discretion as to when and how the helping occurs. But in special circumstances, the “imperfect” duty becomes a “perfect” duty. If, for example, a child clings precariously to a ledge, it becomes a perfect duty to help rescue the child—at least up to the point where one risks one's personal security.

14 The third of the supreme principles of morality, according to the Institute of Moralogy, is the Principle of the Precedence of Duty over Personal Rights. The Institiute of Moralogy, An Outline of Moralogy: A New Approach to Moral Science, (Tokyo, Japan: The Institute of Moralogy, 1987), p. 73.Google Scholar

15 John, Tomasi, “Individual Rights and Community Virtue,” Ethics, vol. 101 (April 1991), p. 521.Google Scholar Tomasi is referring especially to the writing of communitarian philosophers like Alasdair Maclntyre, Charles Taylor, and Michael Sandel.

16 See Maclntyre, Alasdair C.After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981;Google ScholarSandel, Michael. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982;Google Scholar and Taylor, Charles, Sources of the Self (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989).Google Scholar

17 Joel, Feinberg, “Postscript,” in Rights, Justice and the Bounds of Liberty (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 156.Google Scholar

18 Tomasi, Individual Rights and Community Virtues, p. 525.

19 Onora, O'Neill, “Hunger, Needs, and Rights,” in Problems of International Justice, ed. Steven, Luper-Foy (New York: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 63–67.Google Scholar

20 O'Neill, op cit., pp. 81-82. See also O'Neill, Faces of Hunger: An Essay on Poverty, Development and Justice (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1986).Google Scholar