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New Directions in Corporate Governance and Finance: Implications for Business Ethics Research

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 January 2015

Lori Verstegen Ryan ,
Ann K. Buchholtz  and
Robert W. Kolb
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Abstract:

Corporate governance and finance are dynamic academic fields that offer myriad opportunities for business ethics analysis. Within the corporate governance triad in recent years, shareholders have increased their power over boards of directors and executives through both regulation and movements to change corporate by-laws. The impact of board characteristics on firm performance has proven elusive, leading to questions concerning board processes and individual director beliefs and behaviors. At the same time, CEOs have lost considerable power, leaving many struggling to regain their control and maintain their compensation levels, while others adopt a stewardship approach to their posts. In the field of finance, the recent financial debacle has led to a reexamination of financial regulation and of the fundamental nature and purpose of the industry. All of these issues provide business ethicists fodder for investigation and analysis.

Type
Business Ethics Quarterly Twentieth Anniversary Forum, Part II: New Directions for Business Ethics Research
Information
Business Ethics Quarterly , Volume 20 , Issue 4 , October 2010 , pp. 673 - 694
Copyright
Copyright © Society for Business Ethics 2010

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