Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-lj6df Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-10T12:13:35.669Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Rationality, Ethical Codes, and an Egalitarian Justification of Ethical Expertise: Implications for Professions and Organizations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 January 2015

John Dienhart
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract:

In order to understand the nature of ethical evaluation as promoted by ethical codes and as practiced by ethicists, we need to understand the notions of rationality and judgment in terms of which codes are developed and ethical pronouncements are made. Although this paper focuses on what might be called “professional contexts” of ethical evaluation, the proposed view of rationality and judgment is argued to be common to all defensible ethical judgments. The paper begins by examining a classical interpretation of rationality which asserts that rational judgments are universal, necessary, and rule-guided. This is contrasted with a more robust and arguably superior view of rationality articulated by Norman Brown. Brown argues that rational judgments are neither universal, necessary, nor rule-guided. This non-classical view implies that ethical judgments are rational and can be justified in the same way that judgments in law and medicine can be justified. However, if ethics is not a matter of following rules, the very possibility of ethical codes is in doubt. A brief survey of some standard objections to ethical codes shows that they often tacitly rely on the non-classical sense of rationality to show that ethical codes are defective in the way just described: that is, as instruments designed to promote rote, non-rational behavior, codes cannot promote the rational responses that form the core of ethical behavior. However, a closer look at ethical codes reveals that they are not sets of rules. On the contrary, many codes are designed to promote the very kind of non-classical rational judgment that critics argue codes cannot promote. As a result, many of the standard objections to codes are misguided. Yet, this analysis does not suggest that codes are problem free, but rather that their problems are different from what has been traditionally thought. One apparent problem of this analysis is that the similarity of ethical reasoning to legal and medical reasoning suggests that there are ethical experts just as there are legal and medical experts. Although the notion of ethical expertise is one that is thought to be elitist and oppressive, I argue that there is a defensible analysis of ethical expertise that is fundamentally egalitarian. Finally, some ramifications of this analysis are suggested for organizational ethical codes and the practice of business ethics consulting. It is suggested that organizations can play a crucial role in solving some of the most pressing social problems we have, such as those concerning race and gender.

Type
Articles
Information
Business Ethics Quarterly , Volume 5 , Issue 3 , July 1995 , pp. 419 - 450
Copyright
Copyright © Society for Business Ethics 1995

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

——. AICPA Professional Standards (vol. 2). (1992), American Institute of American Certified Public Accounts.Google Scholar
Baumrin, B., and Freedman, B., eds. (1983), Moral Responsibility and the Professions. New York: Haven Publications.Google Scholar
Beauchamp, T. L. (1989), Case Studies in Business, Society and Ethics, second edition. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.Google Scholar
Beneish, M. D., and Chatov, R.. (1993) “Corporate Codes of Conduct: Economic Determinants and Legal Implications for Independent Auditors.” Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, pp. 3–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Benson, G. C. S. (1989), “Codes of Ethics.” Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 8, pp. 305–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bowie, N. (1979), “Business Codes of Ethics: Window Dressing or Legitimate Alternative to Government Regulation?” In Ethical Theory and Business, edited by Beauchamp, T. L. and Bowie, N. E.. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.Google Scholar
Bowie, N. (1991), “Challenging the Egoistic Paradigm.” Business Ethics Quarterly. Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 1–21.Google Scholar
Bowie, N., and Freeman, R. E.. (1992), Ethics and Agency Theory. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Briloff, A. J. (1978), “Codes of Conduct: Their Sound and Their Fury.” In Ethics, Free Enterprise, & Public Policy, edited by DeGeorge, R. T. and Pichler, J. A.. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Brooks, L. J. (1989), “Ethical Codes of Conduct: Deficient in Guidance for the Canadian Accounting Profession.” Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 8, pp. 325–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brown, H. I. (1988), Rationality. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Friedman, M. (1970), “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits.” In Business Ethics: Readings and Cases in Corporate Morality, edited by Hoffman, W. M. and Moore, J.M.. New York: McGraw-Hill.Google Scholar
Gaa, J. C. (1993) “The Auditor’s Role: The Philosophy and Psychology of Independence and Objectivity.” Proceedings of the 1992 Deloitte & Touche/University of Kansas Symposium on Auditing Problems. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.Google Scholar
Kant, I. (1964) Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. Translated by Paton, H. J.. New York: Harper Torchbooks.Google Scholar
Ladd, J. (1985), “The Quest for a Code of Professional Ethics.” In Ethical Issues in the Use of Computers, edited by Johnson, Deborah G. and Snapper, John W.. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.Google Scholar
Miller, P. B. W. and Redding, R.. (1986), The FASB: The People, The Process & the Politics. Homewood, IL: Irwin.Google Scholar
Molander, E. A. (1987), “A Paradigm for Design, Promulgation, and Enforcement of Ethical Codes.” Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 6, pp. 619–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (The Treadway Commission) (1987). Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting. Washington, DC.Google Scholar
Newton, L. (1981) “Lawgiving for Professional Life: Reflections on the Place of the Professional Code.” Business and Professional Ethics Journal, vol. 1.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Neilsen, K. (1978) “Moral Expertise.” Midwestern Journal of Philosophy, pp. 35–45.Google Scholar
Nielsen, R. P. (1988), “Limitations of Ethical Reasoning as an Action (Praxis) Strategy.” Journal on Business Ethics, vol. 7, pp. 725–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Norris, F. (1993a), “A G.M. Loss Could Spur Health Reform.” New York Times. Feb. 7, Section 3, p. 1.Google Scholar
Norris, F. (1993b), “Cooking Books: How Hurricane Losses Vanished.” New York Times. Sept. 5, Section 3, p. 1.Google Scholar
Singer, P. (1972) “Moral Experts.” Analysis, pp. 115–117.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Szabados, B. (1978) “On Moral Expertise.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy. pp. 117–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar