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Recognize Everyone’s Interests: An Algorithm for Ethical Decision-Making about Trade-Off Problems

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 October 2020

Tobey K. Scharding
Tobey K. Scharding*
Affiliation:
Rutgers University
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Abstract

This article addresses a dilemma about autonomous vehicles: how to respond to trade-off scenarios in which all possible responses involve the loss of life but there is a choice about whose life or lives are lost. I consider four options: kill fewer people, protect passengers, equal concern for survival, and recognize everyone’s interests. I solve this dilemma via what I call the new trolley problem, which seeks a rationale for the intuition that it is unethical to kill a smaller number of people to avoid killing a greater number of people based on numbers alone. I argue that killing a smaller number of people to avoid killing a greater number of people based on numbers alone is unethical because it disrespects the humanity of the individuals in the smaller-numbered group. I defend the recognize-everyone’s-interests algorithm, which will probably kill fewer people but will not do so based on numbers alone.

Keywords

trade-off problemsalgorithmsautonomous vehiclesrespect for humanitytrolley problem
Type
Article
Information
Business Ethics Quarterly , Volume 31 , Issue 3 , July 2021 , pp. 450 - 473
Copyright
© The Author(s) 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Society for Business Ethics

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