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Relationships, Authority, and Reasons: A Second-Personal Account of Corporate Moral Agency

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 July 2021

Alan D. Morrison Open the ORCID record for Alan D. Morrison [Opens in a new window] ,
Rita Mota  and
William J. Wilhelm Jr.
Alan D. Morrison
Affiliation:
University of Oxford
Rita Mota
Affiliation:
University of Oxford
William J. Wilhelm Jr.
Affiliation:
University of Virginia
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Abstract

We present a second-personal account of corporate moral agency. This approach is in contrast to the first-personal approach adopted in much of the existing literature, which concentrates on the corporation’s ability to identify moral reasons for itself. Our account treats relationships and communications as the fundamental building blocks of moral agency. The second-personal account rests on a framework developed by Darwall. Its central requirement is that corporations be capable of recognizing the authority relations that they have with other moral agents. We discuss the relevance of corporate affect, corporate communications, and corporate culture to the second-personal account. The second-personal account yields a new way to specify first-personal criteria for moral agency, and it generates fresh insights into the reasons those criteria matter. In addition, a second-personal analysis implies that moral agency is partly a matter of policy, and it provides a fresh perspective on corporate punishment.

Keywords

corporate moral agencyholding responsiblereactive attitudesauthoritysecond-personal competence
Type
Article
Information
Business Ethics Quarterly , Volume 32 , Issue 2 , April 2022 , pp. 322 - 347
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Society for Business Ethics

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