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What is this Thing Called “Reputation”?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 January 2015

Christopher W. Morris
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Abstract:

Concern for one’s “reputation” has been introduced in recent game theory enabling theorists to demonstrate the rationality of cooperative behavior in certain contexts. And these impressive results have been generalized to a variety of situations studied by students of business and business ethicists. But it is not clear that the notion of reputation employed has much explanatory power once one sees what is meant. I also suggest that there may be some larger lessons about the notion of rationality used by decision theorists.

Type
Articles
Information
Business Ethics Quarterly , Volume 9 , Issue 1 , January 1999 , pp. 87 - 102
Copyright
Copyright © Society for Business Ethics 1999

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